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PROTECTING PRIVACY WITH DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES LEGISLATION
Jeff Sovenz*
INTRODUCTION
Informational privacy-the rights consumers may have to prevent
the sale or use of their personal information-is much in the air these
days. It has attracted considerable attention from the legal media,1
the general media,2  and various governmental entities.3
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. A.B.. J.D. Columbia
University. The author thanks St. John's University School of Law for its research
support.
1. In addition to sources cited throughout this article, see, for example, Paul M.
Schwartz & Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law (1996); Steven A. Bibas, A
Contractual Approach to Data Privacy, 17 Harv. J.L & Pub. Pol'v 591 (1994); Mark
E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consuner Transactions in Electronic Commerce-
Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 847 (1998); L. Richard Fischer.
Privacy and Accuracy of Personal Information, 3 N.C. Banking Inst. 11 (1999); Robert
M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a National Level? Thoughts on
the Possible Need .for International Privacy Rules, 41 Vill. L Rev. 129 (1996): Jerry
Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1193 (1998);
Leslie A. Kurtz, The Invisible Becomes Manifest: Information Privacy in a Digital
Age, 38 Washburn L.J. 151 (1998); Arthur R. Miller, The Right of Privacy-A Look
Through the Kaleidoscope, 46 SMU L. Rev. 37 (1992): Richard S. Murphy, Property
Rights in Personal Infornationw An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 Geo. 1U. 2381
(1996); Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privac, in Florida in
the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century." A Need for Protection From
Private and Commercial Intrusion, 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 25 (1997); Richard A. Posner.
The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393 (1978); Dee Pridgen, How Will Consumers
Be Protected on the Infonnation Superhighway?, 32 Land & Water L Rev. 237 (1997):
Judith Beth Prowda, Privacy and Security of Data, 64 Fordham L Rev. 738 (1995);
Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair infornation Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 497 (1995) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Setting Standards];
William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law Protection of Indivituals' Rights in Personal
Information, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 951 (1996): Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy,
Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 Tex. L.
Rev. 1395 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Simson Garfinkel, Database Nation: The Death of Privacy in the 21st
Century (2000) [hereinafter Garfinkel, Database Nation]: Nina Bernstein, Personal
Files Via Computer Offer Money and Pose Threat, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1997, at Al;
Big Browser is Watching You!1, Consumer Rep.. May 2000, at 43; Ann Reilly Dowd,
Money Polk You're Deeply Worried About Your Privaqc. Money, Aug. 1997, at 107
[hereinafter Dowd, Money Poll]; Ann Reilly Dowd, Protect Your Privacy, Money.
Aug. 1997, at 104 [hereinafter Dowd, Protect Your Privacy; Keith H. Hammonds.
Online Insecurity, Bus. Wk., Mar. 16, 1998, at 102; Susan Headden, The Junk Mail
Deluge, U.S. News & World Rep., Dec. 8, 1997, at 40: Robert O'Harrow, Jr., A
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Commentators have proposed different approaches to addressing
consumer privacy.
4
One frequent theme of writers on informational privacy is whether
existing law bars certain informational practices engaged in by various
companies without the consent of affected consumers-chiefly the
collection and sale of information about consumers and the use of this
information to solicit consumers to make purchases. Many writers
have opined on whether the invasion of privacy torts prohibit these
practices.' But few have discussed the possibility that these
informational practices violate deceptive trade practices legislation.6
The purpose of this article is to do just that.
Hidden Toll on Free Calls: Lost Privacy: Not Even Unlisted Numbers Protected From
Marketers, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 1999, at Al [hereinafter O'Harrow, A Hidden Toll];
Jeffrey Rosen, The Eroded Self N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 46:
Andrew L. Shapiro, Privacy for Sale: Peddling Data on the Internet, The Nation, June
23, 1997, at 11; Martin J. Smith, Ever Wonder Why You Get All That Unsolicited Junk
Mail?. Ariz. Republic, Dec. 5, 1993, at Al; Paula Crawford Squires, Transactions Go
Into a Database: Businesses Compile Dossiers on Customers, Rich. Times Dispatch,
July 28, 1996, at A12; Larry Tye, List-Makers Draw a Bead on Many, Boston Globe,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 1; Mary Zahn & Eldon Knoche, Electronic Footprints: Yours are a
Lot Easier to Track Than You May Think, Milwaukee Sentinel, Jan. 16, 1995, at 1A.
3. See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Report to the Congress
Concerning the Availability of Consumer Identifying Information and Financial
Fraud (1997); FTC, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/index.htm [hereinafter Privacy Online 1998];
Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, The Clinton-Gore Plan to Enhance
Consumers' Financial Privacy: Protecting Core Values in the Information Age
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WHNew/html/20000501_4.html (May 1,
2000); Privacy Working Group, Info. Infrastructure Task Force, Privacy and the
National Information Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using Personal
Information (1995) [hereinafter Info. Infrastructure Task Force, Principles]; U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., Privacy and the NII:
Safeguarding Telecommunications-Related Personal Information (1995) [hereinafter
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Privacy and the NII];.
4. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 1, at 591-92 (arguing for a contractual approach);
Kang, supra note 1, at 1246-65 (arguing that the default rule for cyberspace privacy
should be determined by economic efficiency and dignity); Posner, supra note 1, at
393 (using a law and economics approach to argue that common law has treated
privacy correctly); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A
Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 Fed. Comm. L.J. 195, 237-38 (1992)
(suggesting that European systems offer guidance) [hereinafter Reidenberg, Privacy
in the Information Economy].
For a list of those urging expansion of existing common law privacy doctrines to
cover informational privacy, see infra note 54. For arguments seeking application of
certain fairness considerations to privacy, see infra note 19. For those arguing that
American privacy laws should be modified to accommodate European law, see infra
note 24.
5. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
6. There is one recent exception. The Center for Democracy and Technology,
Consumer Action, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and Private Citizen, Inc. petitioned
the FTC to act concerning certain Pentium chips that reveal information about the
users. See Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation, and for
Other Relief, available at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/issues/pentium3/
990226intelcomplaint.shtml (Nov. 16, 2000).
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Part I of this article describes briefly some aspects of the trade in
personal information and reasons why that trade should be regulated.7
Part II turns to regulation of the information trade and reviews
existing statutes and the common law privacy torts. Part III argues
that the collection and sale of personal information without the
knowledge and consent of the person to whom it pertains may violate
the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"). Finally, Part IV
suggests that the information practices of many companies may also
fall afoul of state "little FTC acts."
I. THE TRADE IN PERSONAL INFORMATION
Information about consumers is obtained and used in a myriad of
ways. Some companies notify consumers that they are collecting
information, but many do not. Paul Schwartz has described the
information business on the Internet as "a privacy horror show,"' but
the offline information trade is hardly better.
Some businesses have acquired information in ways that are
particularly troublesome. Three examples illustrate such
objectionable practices. First, the manufacturer of a product for
incontinent women invited people to call a toll-free line to receive
samples. The manufacturer later attempted to peddle the list of the
more than four million consumers who responded.' Similarly, after a
woman spent a night at a lodge, she began receiving solicitations
targeted at lesbians. Apparently the lodge was frequented by
lesbians, and it sold the names of guests to a lesbian mailing list."'
7. I have discussed this in greater detail in Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or
No Options at AlL" The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 Wash. L Rev.
1033 (1999) [hereinafter Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out].
8. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 Vand. L Rev.
1609,1640 (1999).
9. Kevin DeMarrais, Big Brother is Watching Your Database, The Record
(Bergen N.J.), Apr. 30, 1995, at Al. For other examples of such behavior, see Jeffrey
Rothfeder, Privacy for Sale 92-93 (1992) (describing lists of consumers who called
toll-free numbers for pollen count by zip code and consumers who called to receive
Thanksgiving turkey cooking tips); Evan Hendricks, Companies Erploiting Internet's
Ability to Track Consumer Habits, Privacy Times, July 3. 1995, at 3, 4 (describing
company which runs "Free Offer Outlet" on computer services and not only harvests
names, addresses, and phone numbers of people who accept free offers but also
provides information to sponsors for market research and follow-up; harvesting from
one computer service alone said to generate over 300,000 leads in four months); Evan
Hendricks, Rising Traffic in Prescription Info Causes Backlash in D.C., Privacy Times,
Feb. 20, 1998, at 1 (indicating that drug companies capture phone numbers from
consumers calling toll-free numbers for various medications); O'Harrow, A Hidden
Toll, supra note 2 ("In one recent campaign, Merck & Co. worked wvith football coach
Dan Reeves to promote a booklet about heart disease. When individuals call to get
the booklet, they are asked their names, addresses and a series of questions about age,
health history, insurance coverage, and smoking and exercise habits-all of which go
into a database.").
10. Tye, supra note 2.
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Finally, in what is sometimes called "spyware," when consumers buy
and install certain computer programs-such as children's educational
programs or financial planning software-the programs automatically
forward to manufacturers, via the Internet, information about the
consumers, such as details of Web-surfing habits or identifying
personal information."
The number of such lists-that is, lists of people with particular
characteristics or purchasing histories-is staggering. A leading trade
group, the Direct Marketing Association, has estimated that more
than 15,000 lists of consumers exist. 12 The lists available include those
based on ethnicity, political views, and sexual orientation. 3
Other businesses combine information obtained from various
sources to create profiles of consumers, which can then be used to
predict purchasing behavior and assist marketers in deciding which
consumers to target with particular offers. 4 Information about the
average American is said to appear in 25 to 100 databases at any given
moment and to move from one computer to another five times every
business day.'5
11. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Your PC is Watching: Programs That Send Personal
Data Becoming Routine, Wash. Post, July 14, 2000, at Al, available at
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dvn/business/specials/privacy/A39216-200OJul3.htm.
12. Squires, supra note 2.
13. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Privacy and the NII, supra note 3, at A3 ("'Arabs,
In Their Native Lands, Who Gamble and Invest'; 'Doctors Who Are Known to Have
Gambled;' and 'Jewish Philanthropists and Investors."'); Reidenberg, Setting
Standards, supra note 1, at 519-20, 523 (political conservatives and liberals); Headden,
supra note 2, at 42 (sexual orientation and ethnicity); Smith, supra note 2 (Hispanic
New Movers File); Tye, supra note 2 (Italian lineage, Japanese lineage, Jewish
lineage); Zahn & Knoche, supra note 2 (subscribers to gay and lesbian magazines;
Jewish households).
14. See generally Roger Clarke, Profiling: A Hidden Challenge to the Regulation of
Data Surveillance, 4 J.L. & Info. Sci. 403 (1993) (defining and describing profiling and
its social implications). One news story offers several examples of consumer profiles:
Vacuumed into huge databases around the country is information about how
many times you went out to eat last month, about whether your dog prefers
Alpo to Purina .... Details like these are sorted, digested and compiled so
that computers can plop you into neatly defined categories to help
determine the likelihood that you'll pay your Visa bill on time or buy a new
brand of detergent or cigarettes within the next few months... cashing in a
coupon [can put your name and address on a list because] some that arrive
at your home are encoded with digits that will identify you when you trade
them in.
Daniel Mendel-Black & Evelyn Richards, Peering Into Private Lives: Computer Lists
Now Profile Consumers by Their Personal Habits, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1991, at HI;
see also Graham, supra note 1, at 1400-01; Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Data Firms Getting
Too Personal?, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1998, at Al, available at
http://,Nww.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/frompost/march98/privacy/8.htm [hereinafter
O'Harrow, Data Firms]; What Price Privacy?, Consumer Rep., May 1991, at 356.
15. See Rothfeder, supra note 9, at 17; Robert Moskowitz, Protecting Your
Privacy Requires Planning, Investor's Bus. Daily, Sept. 16, 1994, at 1; Shapiro, supra
note 2, at 12.
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Many are not troubled by the trafficking in personal information.
Noted privacy commentator Alan F. Westin, after presiding over
numerous privacy polls, has concluded that about a fifth of the public
is not concerned with privacy.16 But others have reacted with dismay.
Westin believes that about a quarter of the public is deeply concerned
about privacy issues; 7 the remainder-making up slightly more than
half of consumers-are more pragmatic, with shifting views depending
on various considerations.' 8
Those seeking to block certain information practices have identified
a number of rationales. Some privacy advocates have discussed
16. Westin calls these people "Privacy Unconcerned." Alan F. Westin, "Whatever
Works" The American Public's Attitudes Toward Regulation and Self-Regulation on
Consumer Privacy Issues, in U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Privacy and Self-Regulation in
the Information Age (1997), available at http:J'vww.ntia.doc.gov/reports
privacy/selfregl.htm#1F [hereinafter Westin, Whatever Works). Polling data amply
support Westin's view that some consumers are not concerned about informational
privacy, though the precise size of that group may be harder to determine. For
example, a 1996 survey found that 27% of the public was not at all concerned about
having their name on mailing lists while 23% was slightly concerned. Beth Negus,
You're Not Welcome: Direct Survey has Alarming Findings About "Junk" Views and
Data Protection, Direct, June 15, 1996, at 1, 60. The same survey found that half of all
consumers like to get mailings on products and services of interest to them. Id. at 61.
Another 1996 poll found that 43% of respondents say that though they rarely use mail
offers, they do not see them as a problem, while 12% view mail offers as a useful
opportunity. Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., 1996 Equifax/Harris Consumer Privacy
Survey 72 [hereinafter 1996 Equifax/Harris Consumer Privacy Survey]. The
Executive Summary of the 1996 report is available online at
http:l/vwv.equifax.com/consumerlparchivelsvry961docsfsummary.html (last visited
July 28, 1998). In 1991, 46% of respondents saw mail offers as a nuisance. 38% rarely
used them but did not see a problem, and 6% regarded mail offers as useful. Harris-
Equifax Consumer Privacy Survey 1991 16-17 [hereinafter 1991 Harris-Equifax
Consumer Privacy Survey]. A 1990 Equifax poll found that 16% of the respondents
did not view the sharing of information by companies as a problem. Alan F. Westin,
Louis Harris & Assocs., The Equifax Report on Consumers in the Information Age
18 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Equifax Report].
17. Westin calls this group "Privacy Fundamentalists" and describes them as
tending to reject the notion that organizations are entitled to obtain personal
information. Westin, Whatever Works, supra note 16. Polls confirm that some
consumers are indeed privacy fundamentalists. Thus, the 1996 Direct survey also
found that half the public is somewhat or greatly concerned about having their name
on mailing lists and that about half do not wish to receive any mail solicitations at all.
Negus, supra note 16, at 61. Similarly, 37% of the respondents to the 1996 Equifax
poll primarily considered mail offers as a nuisance, while 39% of those responding to
the 1990 Equifax survey believed the sharing of information by companies in the same
industry to be a major problem and 43% called it a minor problem. See 1996
EquifaxlHarris Consumer Privacy Survey, supra note 16, at 74; 1990 Equifax Report,
supra note 16, at 18.
18. Westin labeled this group "Privacy Pragmatists." Westin, Whatever Works,
supra note 16. Westin believes that the views of Privacy Pragmatists shift according to
whether they trust the particular industry, the value to themselves and society of the
particular program calling for the information, whether the information is relevant for
the purpose sought, and what safeguards have been instituted to protect the
information. Id. For additional discussion of different views of privacy elicited by
various surveys, see Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, supra note 7.
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fairness considerations, 19 sometimes citing a number of documents
adopted by various governmental or quasi-governmental entities
calling for widely-accepted fairness practices. 20 Though these fairness
practices are articulated in different ways, the FTC offers a typical
formulation:
(1) Notice - data collectors must disclose their information practices
before collecting personal information from consumers;
(2) Choice - consumers must be given options with respect to
whether and how personal information collected from them may be
used for purposes beyond those for which the information was
provided;
(3) Access - consumers should be able to view and contest the
accuracy and completeness of data collected about them; and
(4) Security - data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure
that information collected from consumers is accurate and secure
from unauthorized use.21
Some of these fairness practices have been adopted by trade
organizations.22
19. See, e.g, Joshua D. Blackman, A Proposal for Federal Legislation Protecting
Informational Privacy Across the Private Sector, 9 Santa Clara Computer & High
Tech. L.J. 431, 461 (1993); Oscar H. Gandy, Legitimate Business Interest: No End in
Sight? An Inquiry into the Status of Privacy in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F. 77,
136-37; Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the
Age of the Internet, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 1153, 1219-22 (1997); Reidenberg, Setting
Standards, supra note 1, at 498-99; Schwartz, supra note 8, at 1670-72, 1681-1701.
20. See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31,
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1995/en_395L0046.html [hereinafter
The European Directive on the Protection of Personal Data]; Canadian Standards
Ass'n, Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information: A National Standard
of Canada (1996), available at http://www.csa-intemational.org/english/
product services/indexjinfo.htm; Info. Infrastructure Task Force, Principles, supra
note 3, at 5-11; Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., OECD Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980); Privacy Prot.
Study Comm'n, Personal Privacy in an Information Society (1977); U.S. Dep't of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens (1973).
21. FTC, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
Marketplace 4 (2000), available at http:l/www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/index.htm
[hereinafter Privacy Online 2000].
22. See, e.g., The Bankers Roundtable, Banking Indus. Tech. Secretariat, Privacy
Principles Implementation Plan 2, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reportsl
privacy3/comments/012b (last visited Jan. 19, 2001) (recognizing notice, choice,
access, and security); Direct Mktg. Ass'n, Direct Marketing Association Guidelines
for Ethical Business Practice 13 (2000), available at http://www.the-
dma.org/library/guidelines/ethicalguidelines.shtml (including guidelines on the
collection, use, and transfer of personal data); Interactive Servs. Ass'n, Principles on
Notice and Choice Procedures for Online Information Collection and Distribution by
Online Operators (June 11, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/
comments/007b.htm (endorsing notice, choice, and access); Letter from Donald D.
1310 [Vol. 69
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Others seeking privacy protections have relied on economic
justifications. Before the United States and the European Union
reached an accord on the treatment of consumer privacy,-3 these
commentators argued that the United States was not in compliance
with the European Directive on Privacy. They claimed that failure to
comply with that directive would affect the ability of transnational
businesses to forward information to their United States operations,
which would impair the functioning of certain American businesses. -4
Kummerfeld, President, Magazine Publishers of America, to Donald Clark, Secretary,
FTC (Mar. 31, 1998) (concerning information guidelines); Letter from Kerry C.
Stackpole, President & Chief Executive Officer, Electronic Messaging Association, to
Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC, (Mar. 31, 1998) (concerning Electronic Messaging
Association Guidelines which include an endorsement of "notice and opt-out
provisions for consumers"); Smart Card Forum. Guide to Responsible Consumer
Information Practices (May 1997), available at httpi'lwww.ftc.govlreportsl
privacy3/comments/001-scf.htm (advocating notice, choice, access, and security).
Each of these documents is available in appendix E to Privacy Online 1998, supra
note 3, and discussed at page 15 of that report. See also Evan Hendricks, Advertisers
Unveil 'Goals' for Electronic Privacy, Privacy Times. Feb. 15, 1996, at 3 (discussing
announcement of Coalition for Advertising Supported Information and
Entertainment, including American Association of Advertising Agencies and
Association of National Advertisers); Evan Hendricks, Bankers Issue 'Best Practices'
Guidelines for Customer Data, id., Dec. 17, 1996, at 4 (discussing Consumer Bankers
Association guidelines).
23. Mary Mosquera, U.S., Europe Reach Data Privacy Accord, Technology News,
at http:llwwv.techweb.com/wirelstoryVTWB2000053 ISOO!5 (May 31. 2000).
The European Union's Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data was
enacted on October 24, 1995. The European Directive on the Protection of Personal
Data, supra note 20. Articles 25 and 26 of the European Directive bar the transfer of
personal data to countries that are not part of the European Union unless certain
conditions are met. Id.
24. See, e.g., Blackman, supra note 19, at 437 (discussing need to comply with EU
directive); Gellman, supra note 1, at 135 (noting that the U.S. once led in the legal
protection of privacy, but now Europe's laws are most progressive); Craig Martin,
Comment, Mailing Lists, Mailboxes, and the Invasion of Privacy: Finding a
Contractual Solution to a Transnational Problem, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 801, 833 (1998)
(discussing conflicts between U.S. and European privacy law), P. Amy Monahan,
Note, Deconstructing Information Walls: The Impact of the European Data Directive
on U.S. Businesses, 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 275, 293 (1998) (urging the creation of
national data protection legislation); Sandra Byrd Petersen, Note, Your Life as an
Open Book- Has Tednology Rendered Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 Fed.
Comm. L.J. 163, 183-84 (1995) (advocating comprehensive federal legislation). But see
Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and
the United States, 33 Ind. L. Rev. 173, 231 (1999) ("U.S. government and business
leaders should avoid imposing costly new privacy protection merely as a sop to
European data protection officials."); Peter P. Swire & Robert E. Litan, Avoiding a
Showdown Over EU Privacy Laws, Brookings Pol'y Brief No. 29 (Feb. 1998) (arguing
that private sector can resolve problem without government intervention, except in
form of enforcement of private agreements) [hereinafter, Swire & Litan, Avoiding a
Showdown]. For a thorough discussion of the extent to which United States laws
meet European standards, see Schwartz & Reidenberg, supra note 1. The effect the
European Directive could have on American business is treated extensively in Peter
P. Swire & Robert E. Litan, None of Your Business: World Data Flows, Electronic
Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive (1998) [hereinafter, Swire & Litan,
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Finally, I have argued elsewhere that the current system both permits
information-gatherers to inflate consumer transaction costs in
preventing the use of personal information, and gives businesses an
incentive to do so.' This practice frustrates consumers who wish to
protect their privacy.
What do these critics of current information practices seek? Many
have suggested that existing laws should be interpreted to prevent
companies from engaging in certain information practices, or that the
law should be changed.2 6 In the remainder of this article, I discuss
legal restraints on the commercial use of consumer information.
II. REGULATION OF THE TRADE IN PERSONAL INFORMATION
Legal restraints on the commercial use of private information could
derive from four potential sources: the common law invasion of
privacy torts; the FTC acting pursuant to its authority under the FTC
Act; existing state deceptive trade practices statutes; or new state or
Federal legislation. Of these, legislation-or something like it,
perhaps in the form of an FTC trade regulation rule-seems the best
choice, for a number of reasons.
A. Statutes
One reason to prefer legislation to case law in formulating privacy
regulations is that case law decisions are generally retroactive in
application." Hence, if a court were to impose liability on the seller of
a mailing list, for example, the court would expose thousands of
mailing list sellers to liability to millions of consumers for sales that
have already occurred and that took place at a time when such sales
were not known to be prohibited. That outcome seems unfair and
unnecessary. If the trade of personal information is to be regulated, it
ought to be done in a way that allows list-sellers fair warning of their
exposure to liability.' Legislation provides such prospective
application.
A second reason why legislation seems preferable to case law in this
arena is rooted in one of the most important justifications for
regulation of the trade in personal information: regulation seems the
best way to accommodate the conflicting preferences of consumers.
Public opinion surveys have consistently and overwhelmingly
demonstrated that on many privacy issues consumer preferences are
None of Your Business].
25. Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, supra note 7, at 1045-51.
26. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
27. See Harry W. Jones, John M. Kernochan, & Arthur W. Murphy, Legal
Method 220 (1980).
28. On occasion, courts do overrule prospectively only, but that is not a common
occurrence. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364
(1932) (lowering freight rates set by state board after finding them excessive).
1312 [Vol. 69
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split.29 Accordingly, I have argued elsewhere for rules that permit
different consumers to act in accordance with their different
preferences.3' Generally, the legislature, a political body, seems better
suited than the courts both to mediate among society's desires and
enact a mechanism to balance those desires. To be sure, legislatures
are subject to lobbying by special interests-which undoubtedly
include those who profit from the sale of information-and so are
sometimes paralyzed.32 But that consequence is one of the prices we
pay for having a democracy, and it would seem strange to accomplish
the will of the majority not through the democratically-elected
legislature but through undemocratically-selected judges.
Congress has, in fact, acted on occasion to protect privacy, though
in very limited ways. It has barred the sale of such things as the names
of videotapes an individual has rented and the movies the individual
has viewed on a pay-per-view basis from the cable provider.1  The
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, - Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, 5 and the FTC's
Telemarketing Sales Rules,36 all require that telemarketers allow
consumers to put their names on "Do Not Call" lists.- A person can
29. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text- see also Sovern. Opting In,
Opting Out, supra note 7, at 1033.
30. See Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, supra note 7, at 1094.
31. Cf. Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 60-61 (1921)
("Judges do not feel the same need of putting the imprimiatur of law upon customs of
recent growth, knocking for entrance into the legal system, and viewed askance
because of some novel aspect of form or feature, as they would if legislatures were not
in frequent session, capable of establishing a title that will be unimpeached and
unimpeachable.").
32. Fenrich, supra note 1, at 978-82: see also Graham, supra note 1, at 1423-25
(arguing that courts are better suited than legislatures for making privacy rules
because across-the-board legislative remedies are "inadequate to deal with the fluid
nature of the information economy," whereas judicial remedies are more flexible).
33. See Video Privacy Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (1994) (barring video
stores from knowingly disclosing certain personal information); Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) (barring disclosure of
certain personally identifiable information): cf. Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) (1994) (forbidding disclosure of content of
communications).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108 (1994).
36. 16 C.F.R. pt. 310 (1999).
37. One report claims that in 1996, consumers recovered more than S54,000 from
companies that did not maintain "Do Not Call" lists and still made telemarketing
calls. See Garfinkel, Database Nation, supra note 2, at 175; see also Stephanie
Gallagher, Telernarketers, Buzz Off.', Kiplinger's Pers. Fin. Mag., Apr. 1999, at 62
(noting that one consumer recovered $8,000 from companies calling in violation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act, and in 1998 members of Private Citizen
collected $76,000 for violations). A number of states also have enacted "Do Not
Call" list legislation. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 501.059(3) (West 1997) (consumers can
have name placed on state-maintained "Do Not Call" list for S10 charge); Ga. Code
Ann. § 46-5-27(d)(1) (Supp. 2000) (consumers can put name on "Do Not Call" list
maintained by Public Service Commission): 815 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann. 413f15(b)(3)
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have his or her name removed from certain mailing lists by notifying
the Postmaster General."
Similarly, when Congress amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act
in 1996, it created an opt-out system-allowing firms to sell
information about consumers unless consumers object-for a process
called pre-screening where ultimately, consumers' information is sold
provided they meet certain qualifications. 9 By contrast, Congress has
required states to refrain from selling consumer motor vehicle data for
the purpose of soliciting consumers unless consumers affirmatively
permit the sale-an opt-in system." In 1998, Congress acted to
protect children's privacy online.41 Most recently, Congress required
financial institutions wishing to share certain consumer information
with nonaffiliated third parties to notify consumers clearly and
conspicuously of their right to opt out of that disclosure. 2 In sum,
(West 1994) (consumers can put their name on a "Do Not Call" list maintained by
company); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.46955(14)-(15) (Michie Supp. 1998) (consumers
can put name on "Do Not Call" list maintained by company and Attorney General);
Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.569(1) (1989) (company violates statute if it calls person on "Do
Not Call" list maintained by company).
38. 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1994) (concerning advertisements that are erotically
arousing or sexually provocative).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. IV 1998). The 1996 amendments took effect in 1997.
When companies use pre-screening, they ask credit bureaus to furnish them with the
names and addresses of consumers who meet certain criteria so that the companies
can solicit such consumers to obtain, for example, credit cards. The statute forbids
consumer reporting agencies to use information about consumers who object to the
pre-screening process. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e); see also Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93, § 51A
(Law. Co-op. 2000) (allowing removal from pre-screening lists). The federal law also
requires consumer reporting agencies to establish a notification system for consumers
to opt-out. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e)(5). Consumer reporting agencies must maintain toll-
free telephone numbers for consumers to express their preferences and advertise the
availability of the opt-out system. Id. Those who obtain the names and addresses of
consumers through pre-screening must notify the consumers whom they solicit of the
consumer's right to opt out. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(d)(1)(D), (E).
The Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") generally governs the use of consumer
reports. The FTC has held that the FCRA applies to certain marketing lists created
from certain consumer credit data compiled by a credit bureau, regarding the data in
such cases as "consumer reports" within the meaning of the statute. See 15 U.S.C. §
1681a(d); In re Trans Union Corp., No. 9255, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/transunionfinord.htm (Feb. 10, 2000). Trans Union has
indicated that it intends to file a petition for review of the FTC's Order with the Court
of Appeals. However, many marketing lists do not contain credit information and are
not based on information compiled by a credit bureau.
40. See Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 1025 (codified at 18
U.S.C.A. § 2721(2000)). The Supreme Court found the statute constitutional in Reno
v. Condon, 528 U.S. 541 (2000).
41. See The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, ("COPPA") 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 6501-6505 (West Supp. 2000). Regulations implementing the statute
appear at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312 (2000). See generally Dorothy A. Hertzel, Note, Don't
Talk to Strangers: An Analysis of Government and Industry Efforts to Protect a Child's
Privacy Online, 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 429 (2000) (discussing the effectiveness of
COPPA and self-regulation by internet industry in protecting children online).
42. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 6802 (West Supp. 2000). The statute has been implemented
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Congress has protected consumer privacy in certain sectors of the
economy but has left consumer privacy in other sectors completely
unprotected by federal regulation. 3
Some states have also passed privacy statutes."' For example, in
certain limited circumstances, Virginia prohibits merchants from
selling information gathered "solely as the result of any customer
payment by... credit card" unless the merchant gives notice to the
consumer.4 1 California requires credit card issuers that sell consumer
information to notify the cardholder and offer the cardholder the
opportunity to opt out. 6 Some states also maintain their own "Do
Not Call" lists.4
through regulations appearing at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216, 332, 573 and 16 C.F.R. pt. 312
(2000).
43. One effort to protect privacy is embroiled in a constitutional challenge.
Acting under the authority of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the Federal
Communications Commission promulgated regulations barring telephone companies
from using phone-calling patterns for marketing purposes without first obtaining the
consumer's permission. 63 Fed. Reg. 20,326 (1998). The FCC's order was vacated in
U.S. West; Ina v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). See generally, Antonia Runac,
Note, Control Over Personal Information: Who Has It, The Consumer or the
Industry?, 12 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 68 (1999) (arguing that the Tenth Circuit should
have upheld the FCC regulations); Julie Tuan, Note, U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 15
Berkeley Tech. LJ. 353 (2000) (same).
44. For a discussion of the merits of national rather than state-by-state privacy
regulation, see Lauretta E. Murdock, Comment, The Use and Abuse of Computerized
Information: Striking a Balance Between Personal Privacy Interests and
Organizational Infonnation Needs, 44 AIb. L. Rev. 589, 610-13 (1980). See also
Fenrich, supra note 1, at 986-89 (discussing information politics at the state level).
45. Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-442 (Michie 1998). The statute bars merchants,
meaning those "engaged in the sale of goods from a fixed retail location in Virginia,"
from selling "to any third person information which concerns the purchaser and which
is gathered in connection with the sale, rental or exchange of tangible personal
property to the purchaser at the merchant's place of business." Id. The merchant may
give that notice "by the posting of a sign or any other reasonable method." Id.
Merchants who give the requisite notice still may not sell consumer information about
any consumer who objects to the sale. The statute has several limitations. First, it
does not apply to services. Second, it is limited to merchants with a retail outlet in
Virginia. Third, it is not clear whether the statute extends to mail-order sales or sales
made over the telephone-are such sales made to the purchaser at the merchant's
place of business? Virginia's Governor's Commission on Information Technology has
also suggested criminalizing a number of practices associated with the sending of
unsolicited commercial e-mail ("UCE"), including falsification of e-mail header
information in UCE and subscribing to an internet service provider for the purpose of
harvesting e-mail addresses for UCE. See The Governor's Comm'n on Info. Tech., A
Legislative Framework For The Virginia Internet Policy Act 13, 26 (Dec. 2, 1998),
available at http//wvwwv.sotech.state.va.usrintpol.com.htm.
46. Cal. Civ. Code § 1748.12(b) (West 1998). The card issuer must either provide
cardholders with a preprinted opt-out form or maintain a toll-free telephone number
for that purpose. Id. The statute does not apply to information furnished to credit
reporting agencies by the card issuer. Id. § 1748.12(e)(2).
California's Constitution describes the right to privacy as an inalienable right. Cal.
Const. art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are ... privacy."). California has interpreted its
constitutional right to privacy as conferring a cause of action not only against
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Other states have regulated unsolicited commercial e-mail, often
called spam.48  Some states require that unsolicited e-mail
advertisements inform recipients how to bar additional e-mail
advertisements from the sender.49 A number of states bar the
knowing transmission of unsolicited commercial e-mail if the header
information-the source and subject line of the message-contains
misleading information about the source or subject of the message."
governmental entities, but also against private entities that invade one's privacy. See,
e.g., Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994). See generally Maureen S. Dorney,
Privacy and the Internet, 19 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 635, 649 (1997) ("[Tjhe
objective of [California's constitutional] privacy right is to protect against ... 'the
overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information by
government and business interests... [and] the improper use of information properly
obtained for a specific purpose."' (citing White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal.
1975)).
47. See supra note 37.
48. See generally Derek. D. Simmons, Comment, No Seconds on Spam: A
Legislative Prescription to Harness Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 3 J. Small &
Emerging Bus. L. 389 (1999) (reviewing various state and federal efforts to control
spain and culling elements from them to propose more effective federal legislation).
49. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17538.4 (West 1998); Iowa Code Ann. § 714E.1
(West 1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 41.730 (Michie 1998); R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-47-2
(1999); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-2501 (Supp. 2000). See generally Jennifer M. Kappel,
Note, Government Intervention on the Internet: Should the Federal Trade Commission
Regulate Unsolicited E-Mail Advertising?, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 1011, 1022-26 (1999)
(discussing state regulation of e-mail advertising and private causes of action for
individuals in states without separate legislation). A San Francisco Superior Court
ruled the California statute unconstitutional in an as yet unpublished decision,
Ferguson v. Friendfinder. The decision is discussed in Evan Hansen, Court Kills Key
Parts of Bulk E-mail Law, at http://news.cnet.comnews//0-1005-200-2047482.html
(June 9, 2000).
50. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.190.020 (West 1998). See generally Steven
Miller, Comment, Washington's "Spam-Killing" Statute: Does It Slaughter Privacy in
the Process?, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 453, 456-60 (1999). Oddly, the Washington law does
not require senders to inform consumers how to remove themselves from lists or even
that senders remove consumers from lists upon demand. See also Del. Code Ann. tit.
11, § 937 (1995) (making unsolicited commercial e-mail a criminal offense); Iowa
Code Ann. § 714E.1 (West Supp. 2000) (prohibiting transmission of bulk e-mail
containing misleading information about source of message); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
14:73.6 (West Supp. 2000) (forging transmission or routing information in connection
with unsolicited bulk e-mail unlawful); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41.730(1)(c) (Michie
1998) (requiring advertisement be "readily identifiable as promotional, or contain[] a
statement providing that it is an advertisement"); N.C. Gen, Stat. § 14-458(a)(6)
(1999) (prohibiting forgery of transmission or routing information); Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 15, § 776.1 (West Supp. 2001) (banning bulk e-mail knowingly sent with "false
malicious or misleading information which purposely or negligently injures a
person"); R.I. Gen. Laws. § 6-47-2 (Supp. 2000) (requiring that sender make available
toll-free telephone number or valid e-mail address); Va. Code Ann. §18.2-152-4(A)(7)
(Michie Supp. 2000) ("It shall be unlawful [to] [f]alsify or forge electronic mail
transmission information...."); W. Va. Code § 46A-6G-2 (1999) (limiting bulk e-
mail with false or misleading information in the subject line). The Washington State
Attorney General's Office has sued at least two spammers for violating the statute.
See HECKELer Silenced, 22 NACAA News No. 3, at 5-6 (Nov./Dec. 1998); Tina
Kelley, Lawsuit Against a Spammer is Filed Under a Oregon Law [sic], N.Y. Times,
Oct. 29, 1998, at G3; Washington Cites Retailer for Sending Unsolicited Mass E-Mail
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Some have even made sending spam a criminal act in certain
circumstances,5' while Tennessee and California require the subject
headings of spam to begin with the letters "ADV:" or "ADV: ADLT"
depending on the nature of the items offered. 2
Nevertheless, Congress and the state legislatures have generally
resisted calls for legislation on informational privacy issues, forcing
privacy advocates to look elsewhere for sources of regulation. Many
have explored the common law privacy torts, and the next section now
discusses those briefly.
B. Common Law Privacy Torts
In discussing the common law privacy torts, Prosser's classic
taxonomy remains a useful starting point. According to Prosser, the
four actionable types of invasion of privacy are: placement of
someone in a false light; public disclosure of private facts; intrusion
upon a person's seclusion or solitude; and appropriation of a person's
name or likeness.53
Though some have urged that these common law privacy torts
could or should be stretched to cover sales of personal information,5'
Advertisements, 76 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 166 (Feb. 18. 1999). In an
unreported decision, a Washington State Superior Court dismissed charges against
one defendant under the statute, ruling that the statute violated the interstate
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. See Amy Pavlock, Wash. State
Span Law Voided, Privacy Times, Mar. 17,2000, at 8. The case is on appeal. See also
Hansen, supra note 49 (discussing decision).
51. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 502(c)(9) (West 1999): Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§
931, 932 (1995); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52-4.1 (2000).
52. Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-2501(e) (Supp. 2000): Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§17538.4(g) (West Supp. 2000).
53. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383. 389 (1960). Some
commentators have also considered whether the sale of consumer information
violates the right of publicity, generally answering in the negative. See, e.g., Patricia
Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight Privacy as Property in the
Electronic Wilderness, 11 Berkeley Tech. LJ. 1, 64-66 (1996).
54. See, e.g., Petersen, supra note 24, at 175 (invasion of privacy torts "are defined
broadly enough that courts could expand their application to the information privacy
arena"); see also Blackman, supra note 19, at 447 (-[The selling or leasing of personal
data constitutes a public disclosure of private facts.... Despite the seemingly viable
claim that the practice of selling mailing lists is an invasion of privacy by intrusion into
another's seclusion, most such cases result in findings of nonliability. It appears that
courts are very reluctant to find damage to the consumer and resultant liability to the
data collector/distributor based on mere unauthorized disclosure of personal
information." (footnotes omitted)); Elizabeth deGrazia Blumenfeld, Privacy Please:
Will the Internet Industry Act to Protect Consuner Privac) Before the Government
Steps In?, 54 Bus. Law. 349, 358-59 (1998) ("None of the four invasion of privacy
torts... provide the broad privacy protections consumers seek against the
unauthorized collection of personal information on the Internet. One, however-the
unreasonable intrusion upon another's seclusion-could offer, in limited situations,
remedies to consumers who feel their privacy has been invaded through such online
collection." (footnote omitted)); Fenrich, supra note 1, at 1003 ("[Clourts can, and in
fact should .. grant individuals privacy rights in personal information.") Graham,
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others have disagreed, or at least expressed reservations. 5 Because
others have extensively discussed application of these torts to the
information industry, I will devote little space to discussing them. I do
agree that the invasion of privacy torts seem malleable enough to
cover the privacy concerns discussed in this article, if a court is
supra note 1, at 1412-13, 1427-31 (concluding that privacy torts as currently construed
do not cover informational privacy but suggesting that they could be stretched to
protect informational privacy, though ultimately arguing that a new tort should be
created); John A. McLaughlin, Comment, Intrusions Upon Informational Seclusions
in the Computer Age, 17 J. Marshall L. Rev. 831 (1984) (arguing intrusion upon
seclusion privacy tort should cover informational intrusion). For the argument that
spam also constitutes a trespass to chattel, see Anne E. Hawley, Comment, Taking
Spam Out of Your Cyberspace Diet: Common Law Applied to Bulk Unsolicited
Advertising via Electronic Mail, 66 UMKC L. Rev. 381,382-95 (1997).
55. For example, Joel Reidenberg writes:
In isolation, each of [the right to privacy] torts does not provide broad
restriction on the circulation and treatment of personal information.
Together, however, they do suggest a somewhat more active role of law in
regulating conduct between citizens in comparison to the traditional
constitutional preferences regulating conduct between the state and its
citizens. The combination of narrow rights still does not offer more than a
small set of targeted restrictions on information flows.
Reidenberg, Setting Standards, supra note 1, at 505 (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g.,
Schwartz & Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 329, 334 (remarking that "[slurreptitious
collections of personal information without notice or consent are not likely to be
sufficiently 'objectionable"' to amount to violation of intrusion privacy tort; public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts tort "difficult to sustain" because courts
usually rule that "restricted distribution of personal information to narrow groups of
recipients does not qualify as public disclosure" (footnotes omitted)); Bibas, supra
note 1, at 596-97 (The invasion of privacy "torts only cover highly offensive, private
matters of no legitimate public concern. Typically, data dissemination does not
involve publicity as courts have defined the term, and it rarely involves highly
offensive matters"(footnotes omitted)); Gandy, supra note 19, at 126 ("tort without
substance"); Gindin, supra note 19, at 1194 ("The traditional right of privacy torts
have [sic] not always been persuasive in redressing invasions of informational
privacy."); Overton & Giddings, supra note 1, at 44 ("[Njone of the privacy torts is
likely to provide relief for the unauthorized commercial sale or compilation of
personal information."); Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy, supra note
4, at 221-27 (expressing general pessimism about whether courts will interpret the
invasion of privacy torts to cover information practices of companies, but noting the
possibility that courts might ban certain uses); Scott Shorr, Note, Personal
Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy Without Violating the First
Amendment, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1756, 1794 (1995) ("Despite the common law's
reputation for adaptability to changing social conditions, the privacy tort seems
structurally incapable of securing for consumers the control over personal
information that they need to prevent computer-assisted commercial privacy
violations."). Another author states:
While appropriation, false light, and intrusion may not, by definition, apply
to the indiscriminate use of information compiled in private sector
computers, public disclosure of private facts is a tort under which one might
possibly recover for another's abuse of personal computer information. Two
elements of this tort may defeat this attempt, however. Public knowledge of
the private facts must be highly objectionable, and the facts must be
published.
John Barlow Spear, Note, Computers in the Private Sector: Right to Informational
Privacy for the Consumer, 22 Washburn L.J. 469, 475-76 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
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disposed to cover them, and that may account for the differing views
expressed by commentators. But court decisions considering the
matter have generally declined to extend the doctrines that far. For
example, in Shibley v. Time, Inc.,56 the court-focusing especially on
the appropriation strand of the invasion of privacy tort-rejected
plaintiff's claim that selling subscription lists containing the plaintiff's
name without obtaining plaintiff's permission constituted an invasion
of privacy. 7
56. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975); see also Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652
N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (relying on Shibley, the court held that sale of
personal information does not violate unauthorized intrusion into seclusion or
appropriation strands of right to privacy torts); Senogles v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
536 P.2d 1358, 1362 (Kan. 1975) (finding no invasion of privacy when insurer gave
plaintiffs medical information to Medical Information Bureau, a clearinghouse for
medical information for insurers).
In Perry v. Moskins Stores, Inc., the court found no invasion of privacy when a wife
left her husband because the retailer had sent the husband and other prospective
customers a postcard on which was written, in feminine handwriting, only the words
"Please call Wabash 1492 and ask for Caroline." 249 S.W.2d 812, 813-14 (Ky. 1952).
The court commented, "Modem day advertising techniques have come to be accepted
and are in effect a limitation on the individual's right of privacy. Such methods are
not actionable so long as they are not unreasonable." Id.; see also Bradshaw v. Mich.
Nat'l Bank, 197 N.W.2d 531, 532 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972) (sending unsolicited credit
card is not invasion of privacy).
In McCormick v. Haley, a surviving spouse, and the children of the decedent, sued a
doctor for invasion of privacy after the doctor sent a mailing addressed to the
decedent that said "A check-up will keep you smiling... Missed You!" 307 N.E.2d
34, 35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973). The court stated that no actionable invasion of privacy
claim existed if the mailing was only negligent. Id. at 38. However, because two
similar mailings were sent after the doctor was sued for wrongful death, if those
mailings were sent intentionally for the purpose of harassment, an invasion of privacy
action would lie. Id.; cf Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 768 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir.
1985) (finding no false light invasion of privacy when defendant sent consumers'
credit report to seventeen subscribers over three years because no publicity was given
to credit report).
In Lamont v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, the plaintiff sued the state for selling
motor vehicle registration information and sued the private company that compiled
and re-sold information for violating his constitutional right to privacy. 269 F. Supp.
880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), affid, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967). The court dismissed the case,
stating:
The short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can... is an
acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned. And the
bells at the door and on the telephone, though their ring is a more imperious
nuisance than the mailman's tidings, accomplish more peripheral assaults
than the blare of an inescapable radio.
Id. at 883. The Shibley decision is criticized in Fenrich, supra note 1, at 990-91.
57. Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339. Consumers continue to bring court challenges
against direct marketers. Ram Avrahami of Virginia sued U.S. News & World
Reports for selling his name to Smithsonian Magazine. Garfinkel, Database Nation,
supra note 2, at 178-82; Fenrich, supra note 1, at 993-94. Avrahami claims the sale
violated section 8.01-40 of the Virginia Code, which bars the appropriation of names
without consent. Garfinkel, Database Nation, supra note 2, at 178-82; Fenrich, supra
note 1, at 993-94. The Arlington County Circuit Court dismissed Avrahami's
complaint because Avrahami had deliberately misspelled his name as "'Avrahani."
Garfinkel, Database Nation, supra note 2, at 178-82; Fenrich, supra note 1, at 993-94.
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While the literature on informational privacy contains extensive
discussion of the privacy torts, it has generally overlooked the FTC
Act. The next part now turns to the FTC Act.
III. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
Though the FTC Act does not mention privacy-it prohibits unfair
and deceptive trade practices 5 -it could in fact offer more
informational privacy protection than the privacy torts because of the
extraordinary scope given its language. To understand how the FTC
Act has been applied, it is first necessary to understand the role of the
FTC in interpreting the FTC Act. For a variety of reasons, the FTC
has considerable latitude in determining whether particular conduct
violates the FTC Act. 9
Another plaintiff sued for invasion of privacy, intentional or reckless disregard of
safety, fraud, unjust enrichment, infliction of emotional distress, breach of contract,
and negligent entrustment in Dennis v. Metromail Corp. Gindin, supra note 19, at
1191. The plaintiff had completed a survey which the defendant company then had
processed by a prison inmate. The inmate later sent the plaintiff an offensive letter.
The plaintiff also objected to the defendant's sale of information and the process by
which the defendant obtained the information in question. Id. Similarly, Michael
Worsham completed postal forms which permit consumers to object to mail and
require the Postal Service to send Prohibitor Orders to mailers. Evan Hendricks,
Holy Pandering! Dynamic Duo Takes on the Junk Mailers, Privacy Times, Sept. 6,
1995, at 3, 4. Among the marketers Worsham objected to are Wal-Mart, Macy's, and
Val-Pak. Id. at 4. Worsham reportedly claims that one of the mailers violated the
order and intended to seek a Postal Service hearing. Id. The saga of one victorious
consumer began when he purchased an item at a store and observed the clerk typing
his name. The consumer secured the clerk's agreement not to enter his name on a
mailing list and wrote on his check that the store agreed not to send him mailings and
that if the store did so the damages would equal $1,000. See Evan Hendricks, After
Small Claims Win, Man Embarks on Junk Mail 'Jihad', Privacy Times, Jan. 19, 1996,
at 5. After the store sent the consumer several mailings, the consumer won a
judgment of $1,000 in Small Claims Court. Id.; see also Cyndee Miller, Telemarketing
Foes: Don't Reach Out to Us, Marketing News, July 3, 1989 at 1 (Consumer told
companies that he would charge them for telemarketing. After company continued to
call, consumer went to court and won $38.97, plus court costs and payment for one
month's charge for an unlisted number. Consumer has since obtained $250 from ten
companies and founded Private Citizen, Inc., a company that has more than 1,000
subscribers paying $15 each per year to maintain directory of their names sent to
telemarketers as people who object to telemarketing and will charge companies $100
per telemarketing call.).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994) ("Unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."). For a discussion of the enactment of the
FTC Act, see Gerard C. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission 16-27 (6th prtg.
1968); Susan Wagner, The Federal Trade Commission 4-18 (1971); Peter C. Ward,
Federal Trade Commission: Law, Practice and Procedure §§ 1.01, 1.02; Earl W.
Kintner, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1269,
1271-75 (1966).
59. See generally Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices
Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 437, 440-45 (1991)
(discussing the broad interpretative authority of the FTC) [hereinafter Sovern, Private
Actionsl.
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A. The FTC's Role in Interpreting the FTC Act
First, Congress has delegated enormous power to the FTC in this
field.6  The FTC Act does not define "deception," thus leaving it to
the courts and the FTC to determine the meaning of that word.
Second, in addition to this broad congressional delegation of power,
courts treat Commission decisions with great deference:" as a result,
it has fallen largely to the FTC to decide what constitutes deception.
Until 1994, the FTC Act similarly did not define unfairness. And
when Congress amended the FTC Act in 1994 to limit the FTC's
unfairness power, it merely codified the standards for unfairness
previously articulated by the FTC.62
Third, only the FTC itself can enforce the FTC Act." Thus, simply
60. Cf Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of " Unfair Acts or Practices" in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Conmzission Act, 70 Geo. L.J. 225, 236 (1981) (stating one lesson of
legislative history "is that the Commission has considerable latitude in identifying
,unfair' consumer practices").
61. For example, one opinion notes,
[Tihe FTC has accumulated much expertise. We are not to lightly set aside
agency action based on the exercise of such accumulated expertise merely
because, were we trying the matter anew, we might reach a different result.
We are not to set aside the Commission's action unless it is apparent that it
is unsupported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law.
Simeon Mgmt. Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted);
see also FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46.48-49 (1965) ("The Commission is
often in a better position than are courts to determine when a practice is 'deceptive'
within the meaning of the Act" (citing FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374,
385 (1965))); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.. 380 U.S. 374. 385 (1965) ('jTJhe
Commission's judgment is to be given great weight by reviewing courts."). See
generally Developments in the Law, Deceptive Advertising, 80 Harv. L Rev. 1005,
1039 (1967) ("[R]ecent judicial opinions yield the Commission very broad discretion
on all of the critical issues."); Candace Lance Oxendale, Comment, The FTC and
Deceptive Trade Practices: A Reasonable Standard?, 35 Emory LJ. 683, 685 (1986)
("[T]he appellate courts, mindful of the presumed expertise of the Commissioners in
the field of trade regulation, have applied a very deferential standard of review to
FTC determinations."); Belinda Welti, Note, The Need for a Statutory Definition of
"Deceptive" Advertising, 19 New Eng. L. Rev. 127, 127 (1983) ("Reviewing courts
defer to FTC findings of deceptive advertising."). For criticism of judicial deference
to the FTC on the issue of deception, see Robert Pitofsky Beyond Nader: Consumer
Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 678-79 (1977).
62. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-312,
108 Stat. 1691 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1994)). The Senate Report
explains:
This section is intended to codify... the principles of the [FTC's Policy
Statement]. Since the FTC's policy statement itself is based on the FTC's
decided cases and rules, this section codifies existing law. The incorporation
of these criteria should enable the FTC to proceed in its development of the
law of unfairness with a firm grounding in the precedents decided under this
authority, and consistent with the approach of the FTC and the courts in the
past.
S. Rep. No. 103-130, at 12-13 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776. 1787-88.
63. Among the cases that have ruled that the Act may not be enforced through
private actions are Bott v. Holiday Universal, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) J 60,973,
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by deciding when to proceed and when not to, the FTC can shape
jurisprudence under the FTC Act.
Fourth, the Commission also possesses the quasi-legislative power
to promulgate regulations prohibiting conduct as unfair or deceptive. 4
With this power, the FTC has made a multitude of rules on disparate
subjects, including such things as mail order transactions and the
classic holder in due course doctrine in consumer transactions. 65 In
short, the FTC enjoys such broad discretion in defining deceptive and
unfair conduct that if the FTC could produce colorable arguments
that the information practices discussed in this article violate the FTC
Act, it is very likely that courts would sustain that judgment.
The FTC has taken the position that the FTC Act regulates the
collection of personal information in two circumstances: first, when
affirmative misrepresentations are made in the collection of
information, 6 and second, in some circumstances when information is
collected from children online.67
at 69,302 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 1976); Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986,
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf
Pan Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 306 (1963) (stating in dicta
that statute based on FTC Act does not create a remedy for private wrongs, but is
merely a way to vindicate the public interest). But cf Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the
Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 589 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (finding private right of action exists
when FTC had previously entered a cease and desist order against defendant's parent
corporation). See generally Stephen W. Gard, Purpose and Promise Unfulfilled: A
Different View of Private Enforcement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70
Nw. U. L. Rev. 274 (1975) (arguing for private cause of action); Alan J. Bentkofsy,
Note, Private Judicial Remedies for False and Misleading Advertising, 25 Syracuse L.
Rev. 747 (1974) (same). But see Steven Naclerio, The Federal District Court as a Small
Claims Tribunal: An Argument Against the Holding in Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 5
Hofstra L. Rev. 345 (1977) (opposing private right of action); Comment, Private
Enforcement and Rulemaking Under the Federal Trade Commission Act: Expansion of
FTC Responsibility, 69 Nw. U. L. Rev. 462 (1974) (same).
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A) (1994).
65. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1999) (holder in due course); id. § 435.1 (1999) (mail
order transactions). On the holder in due course rule, see generally Jeff Sovern,
Paradigm and Paradox in New York Consumer Credit Law: After Holder in Due
Course, 6 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 119 (1987) [hereinafter Sovern, Paradigm].
66. Thus, in 1998, the Commission reached an agreement with GeoCities, a
popular site on the internet. The agreement was confirmed in a consent order
entered in 1999. In re GeoCities, Inc., No. C-3850, at
http:l/www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9902/9823015.do.htm (Feb. 5, 1999). The FTC charged
GeoCities with, among other things, selling information to third parties that
GeoCities stated it would not disclose to outsiders without permission. The consent
order prohibited GeoCities from making certain misrepresentations. It also
contained certain terms, described by the Commission as "fencing in provisions,"
which require GeoCities to post a clear notice on its web site explaining its
information practices, including what information is being collected, its intended uses,
how the consumer can obtain access to the information, and how the consumer can
have the information deleted. The complaint, an analysis of the proposed order, and
other documents can be found at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9808 (last visited Sept.
24, 1998).
In another action which ended in a consent order, In re Liberty Financial Co., No.
982-3522, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9905/lbrtycmp (May 6, 1999), the FTC charged
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the company with, among other things, representing that information collected from
children would be "totally anonymous" when in fact the information was maintained
in a database in an identifiable form. Ultimately, the company agreed to a consent
order in which it did not admit wrongdoing. The complaint, an analysis of the
proposed order, and other documents can be found at http'Jlwww.ftc.gov/os1I99919905
(last visited Jan. 16, 2001).
In FTC v. Toysmartcom, LLC, the FTC filed a complaint against Toysmart.com in
Massachusetts federal district court seeking to enjoin the company, which had
promised on its web site not to disclose personal information to third parties, from
selling customer lists after the company solicited bids for its customer lists. First
Amended Complaint For Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, at
http:/Ivww.ftc.gov/os2000l07/toysmartcomplaint.htm (last visited Nov. 16. 2000)
[hereinafter Amended Complaint, FTC v. Toysmart.com]. The FTC and
Toysmart.com reached an agreement under which the company could sell its
customer lists only to a business that purchased the company's entire web site and
that agreed to be the company's successor-in-interest as to the customer information.
See Judge: No One Wants to Play with To'ysmart's List, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1007-200-2549755.html (Aug. 17, 2000). The judge,
however, declined to approve the agreement because no buyer for the information
had surfaced. She left open the possibility that the agreement would be approved
when a buyer appears. Id The original Toysmart.com complaint is available at
http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/toysmartcmp.htm (last visited July 11, 2000). A press
release announcing the agreement, and accompanying documents, including an
amended complaint, the agreement, a dissenting statement by Commissioner Swindle,
and separate statements by Commissioners Anthony and Thompson, appear at
http://wvw.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2000). See also
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, FTC v. Rennert, No. 992-3245, at
http://wwwv.ftc.gov/os2000/07iogordrennert.htm (July 12, 2000) (FTC filed suit and
reached agreement wvith online pharmacies that promised that information supplied
to pharmacies would be used solely to supply customers with requested products:
services later used information to send its customers unsolicited commercial e-mail).
The complaint, final orders, statements by some of the Commissioners, and a press
release can be found at http:/www.ftc.govopa/2000O07iog.htm (last visited July 19,
2000). Cf. In re Equifax, 96 F.T.C. 844 (1980), order set aside in part on other grounds,
678 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that it is deceptive for information collectors to
misrepresent who their employers are; it is also deceptive to represent inaccurately
that medical information would be released only to insurance companies); FTC,
Public Workshop on Consumer Information Privacy, Session Three: Consumer
Online Privacy 15 (June 12, 1997), available at http:l//%wv.ftc.govl
bcp/privacy/wkshp97/index.html (remarks of Commissioner Varney and David
Medine, Associate Director for Credit Practices, agreeing that e-mails containing
inaccurate removal instructions may be within FTC's existing fraud or deception
authority).
Though consent orders are less authoritative than opinions that were the products
of litigation, FTC consent orders are still more authoritative than conventional
settlements. When the FTC issues a complaint, the Commission determines that the
complained-of practice, if proven, violates one of the laws it is charged with enforcing.
See Jonathan Sheldon & Carolyn L. Carter, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices
§ 3.4.5.3, at 133 (4th ed. 1997); Jeff Sovern, Good Will Adjustment Games: An
Economic and Legal Analysis of Secret Warranty Regulation, 60 Mo. L Rev. 323, 375
(1995) [hereinafter Sovern, Good Will]; see also FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385,
391 (1959) ("[FTC interpretation of statute] entitled to great weight ... even though it
was applied in cases settled by consent rather than in litigation."); People ex rel.
Hartigan v. Maclean Hunter Publ'g Corp., 457 N.E.2d 480,487 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
("[Clonsent orders are not authoritative as adjudications, but they are not without
precedential value."). For example, the FTC's order in GeoCities notes that the
Commission has "determined that it had reason to believe that the respondent has
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Writing in the context of online privacy, the Commission has
repeatedly said "[a]s a general matter, however, the Commission lacks
authority to require firms to adopt information practice policies or to
abide by the fair information practice principles on their Web sites, or
portions of their Web sites, not directed to children." s At least one
violated the [FTC Act]." In re Geocities, Inc., No. C-3850, (Feb. 5, 1999), at
http:lwww.ftc.gov/os/19991990219823015.do.htm.
67. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The Commission brought an action
in federal district court to enforce COPPA in FTC v. Toysmart.com, LLC. Amended
Complaint, FTC v. Toysmart.com, supra note 66. The case terminated in a
settlement. See Stipulated Consent Agreement and Final Order, FTC v.
Toysmart.com, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2OOOIO7/toysmartconsent.htm (last visited
Dec. 4, 2000). The statute was enacted after the FTC concluded that its existing
power reached certain practices pertaining to the gathering of information from
children online. See Privacy Online 1998, supra note 3, at 12-13. The Report notes:
(a) It is a deceptive practice to represent that a site is collecting
personal identifying information from a child for a particular purpose (e.g. to
earn points to redeem a premium), when the information will also be used
for another purpose that parents would find material, in the absence of a
clear and prominent disclosure to that effect; and
(b) It is likely to be an unfair practice to collect personal identifying
information, such as a name, e-mail address, home address, or phone
number, from children and to sell or otherwise disclose such identifying
information to third parties, or to post it publicly online, without providing
parents with adequate notice and an opportunity to control the collection
and use of the information through prior parental consent.
Id. The Report also states that:
To assure that notice and choice are effective, a Web Site should
provide adequate notice to a parent that the site wishes to collect personal
identifying information from the child, and give the parent an opportunity to
control the collection and use of that information. Further, according to the
staff opinion letter, in cases where the information may be released to third
parties or the general public, the site should obtain the parent's actual or
verifiable consent to its collection.
The content of the notice should ... take into account the fact that
online activities may be unique and unfamiliar to parents. Thus, a notice
should be sufficiently detailed to tell parents clearly the type(s) of
information the Web site collects from children and the steps parents can
take to control the collection and use of their child's personal information.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The FTC's position on children's privacy in the 1998 report
was foreshadowed by a 1997 staff letter that opined:
It is a deceptive practice to represent that a Web site is collecting personally
identifiable information from a child for a particular purpose... when the
information will also be used for another purpose which parents would find
material, in the absence of a clear and prominent disclosure to that
effect.... We believe that it would likely be an unfair practice in violation of
Section 5 to collect personally identifiable information.., from children and
sell or otherwise disclose such identifiable information to third parties
without providing parents with adequate notice.., and an opportunity to
control the collection and use of the information.
Letter from Jodie Bernstein, Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, to
Kathryn C. Montgomery and Jeffrey A. Chester of the Center for Media Education
(July 15, 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9707/cenmed.htm.
68. Privacy Online 2000, supra note 21, at 34; see also Privacy Online 1998, supra
note 3, at 41. Chief Commissioner Pitofsky gave testimony before the Senate:
[Senator] WYDEN: Do you believe that you have existing rulemaking
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recent case, FTC v. ReverseAuction.Con, Inc.-1 raises questions,
however, about whether the FTC can be persuaded to go beyond
these limits in some circumstances, though the Commission seems
unprepared to acknowledge that. Indeed, recently the FTC has
concluded that some regulation of online privacy is needed, but that
Congress, not the Commission, should be the source of that
regulation. 0
In fact, colorable arguments can be made that the trafficking in
personal information-whether online or offline-about adults
authority under your underlying statute, the organic statute, to protect
consumer privacy?
[Chief Commissioner] PITOFSKY: No. No, we do not; that's the point. It
seems to me we need the kind of legislation that we've recommended and
then you and Senator Bums have offered in order to engage in rulemaking.
We could call invasions of privacy unfair, but I do not believe that we could
sustain that position.
Internet Privacy Hearing Before the Sen. Commerce Coinn., 107th Cong. 31 (2000).
available at 2000 WL 699924. Chairman Pitofsky also gave testimony concerning
scope of the FTC's power before a House Subcommittee:
Currently, the Commission has limited authority to prevent abusive
practices in this area. The [FTC Act] grants the Commission authority to
seek relief for violations of the Act's prohibitions on unfair and deceptive
practices in and affecting commerce, an authority limited in this context to
ensuring that Web sites follow their stated information practices.
Statement of the FTC on "Consumer Privacy on the World Wide Web" Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection of the House
Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. n.23 (July 21, 1998), available at
http:/lwww.ftc.gov/os19807/privac98.htm; see also Roscoe B. Starek, III & Lynda M.
Rozell, The Federal Trade Commission's Commitment to On-Line Consumer
Protection, 15 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 679, 697 (1997) (stating in an article
co-authored by FTC Commissioner, "There are no plans for the Commission to issue
privacy guidelines or regulations. Instead... the Commission is looking first to
businesses to address privacy issues through voluntary measures .... "); BNA Special
Report, Privacy Rights Advocates Urge FTC to Regulate Marketing Directed to Kids,
72 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 600, 600 (1997) (quoting FTC Commissioner
Roscoe B. Starek, III, on privacy, that "[wle cannot and should not dictate the forms
of your self-regulation or attempt to regulate by threat of commission action in areas
where we lack authority"). When the FTC approved the order in GeoCities, see supra
note 66, Commissioner Orson Swindle wrote a concurring statement in which he
stated that he had
voted in favor of final issuance of the consent order in this matter because its
provisions are appropriate to remedy the alleged violations of the law by
GeoCities, Inc. However, I want to emphasize that my support for these
provisions as a remedy for alleged law violations in this particular case does
not necessarily mean that I would support imposing these requirements on
other commercial Internet sites through either legislation or regulation.
In re GeoCities, Inc., No. C-3850, at http'Jlwww.ftc.gov/os 1999/99021
9823015swindlestatement.htm (Feb. 5, 1999) (Swindle, concurring).
69. The case ended in a Consent Agreement. See Stipulated Consent Agreement
and Final Order, FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., at http'Jlwv%%Iv.ftc.govlos
2000/01/reverseconsent.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2000) [hereinafter, Consent
Agreement, FTC v. ReverseAuction.coml. ReverseAuction.com is discussed infra
notes 164-76 and accompanying text.
70. Privacy Online 2000, supra note 21, at 36.
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without their knowledge, and perhaps even consent, already violates
the FTC Act's prohibition on unfair and deceptive trade practices.7'
Whether it would be desirable for the FTC to take that position, is, of
course, another question. The following sections turn to these issues.
Subpart B will first discuss generally the FTC's power under the
unfairness prong of the FFC Act. Subpart C then turns to the FTC's
power to bar deceptive practices, and Subpart D addresses FTC cases
dealing with privacy.
B. Unfairness
The word "unfair" is so vague-and so common in legal
arguments-that it may be more helpful to start by identifying the
goals of the FTC's unfairness doctrine. One thoughtful observer of
the FTC, Michael M. Greenfield, has identified two such goals, one of
which is particularly applicable to sales of personal information.
Greenfield has written:
One is the effectuation of clearly established public policy .... The
other, more prominent, concern is the maintenance of a properly
functioning free market. Hence, the Commission intervenes when
sellers or creditors create impediments to the operation of a
competitive market or when they take advantage of impediments
that exist independently of their efforts.
Critical to the operation of a free market is the ability of the
consumer, based on complete information, to choose freely whether
or not to enter a transaction with a seller or creditor. The
Commission has stated the essential characteristics of a free market
to be competition, availability of information, lack of excessive
71. One former FTC Commissioner suggested while still in office that the FTC's
existing authority reaches this far, at least insofar as the internet is concerned, though
the remarks came in a context that raises doubt about whether they reflect a
considered opinion. See FTC, Public Workshop on Consumer Information Privacy,
Session Two: Consumer Online Privacy 159 (June 11, 1997), available at
http:lvrvw.ftc.govlbcp/privacy/wkshp97/volume2.pdf.
Janlori Goldman (Visiting Scholar, Georgetown University Law Center):
But for those bad actors; they are not saying anything about what their
information practices are, they are not giving any kind of notice, and so it
seems to me that either the FTC's jurisdiction and authority should be
expanded, not just to look at people who are making misrepresentations but
who are acting in a way which would be considered to be unfair.
Commissioner Varney: Our jurisdiction may not need to be expanded to do
that. We do have authority in unfairness.
Id.; cf id., Session Four: Database Study 87-88 (June 13, 1997) (quoting remarks of
Commissioner Varney: "I think we all agree that if a site says it's collecting
information for one purpose and is using it for a different purpose, that is either
fraudulent, deceptive or unfair. I don't think you have got any disagreement about
that.").
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transaction costs, lack of costs and benefits external to the decision
process, and mobility of resources.
For many consumers, the free market has not functioned to give
them a choice as to whether their personal information will be sold.
Many consumers remain unaware that a trade in their personal
information exists.73 Of those consumers who do know about the
trade in personal information, many do not know that they can opt
out of that trade.74 Lastly, even those aware both of the trade and the
72. Michael M. Greenfield, Consumer Law 95 (1995) (footnotes omitted); see also
Averitt, supra note 60, at 248 ("[T]his analysis would ask whether the consumer
problems at issue were caused by a market failure, so that government intervention
should replace the usual reliance on market forces as a corrective.").
73. See Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, First Annual Report (1994), available at
http://www.privacyrights.org/AR/annrepl.html ("Most [consumers] are unaware of
the ways in which personal information is... used and distributed...."); H. Jeff
Smith, Managing Privacy 4 (1994) ("[Clonsumers tend to be quite uninformed
regarding the actual [privacy] policies and practices of industries with which they deal
regularly."); Frank V. Cespedes & H. Jeff Smith, Database Marketing: New Rules for
Policy and Practice, Sloan Mgmt. Rev., Summer 1993, at 7, 8 ("Our interviews with
consumers... suggest that they are still largely unaware of how information about
them is gathered and used...."); Schwartz, supra note 8, at 16S3 (noting that
"individuals are likely to know little or nothing about the circumstances under which
their personal data are captured, sold, or processed" on the internet); Simson L
Garfinkel, How Computers Help Target Buyers, Businesses Screen and ldentify
Potential Customers with Information .from Credit-Bureau Databases, Christian Sci.
Monitor, July 25, 1990, at 13 (quoting Bonnie Guiton, Special Adviser for Consumer
Affairs to President Bush, as saying "A major concern of mine is that consumers are
uninformed.... In most cases, they don't even know that [information on them] is
being collected.") [hereinafter Garfinkel, How Computers Help]; O'Harrow, Data
Firms, supra note 14 (quoting Leslie L. Byrne, former director of the U. S. Office of
Consumer Affairs as saying "most people don't have a clue what's being gathered
about them"); Ticked Off At AmEx, USA Today, May 26, 1992, at 10A (revealing
that consumer assumed personal data provided to credit card companies and other
lenders was protected by a business ethics code); Westin, Whatever Works, supra note
16 (reporting on 1997 survey concerning online privacy finding "71% of respondents
online were not aware of their services' information policies... and that most visitors
to web sites were not aware of the policies those sites followed in collecting visitors'
personal information"); cf Gandy, supra note 19, at 107 ("Consumers generally were
not aware that calls made to 800 and 900 number information services, especially to
'976' or other sexually oriented services, generated transaction records."). Peter
Swire has pointed out that consumer ignorance of company use of their personal
information may have significant costs:
Because the company internalizes the gains from using the information, but
can externalize a significant share of the losses, it will have a systematic
incentive to over-use private information. In terms of the contract approach,
companies will have an incentive to use private information even where the
customers would not have freely bargained for such use.
Peter P. Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and Government Enforcement in the
Protection of Personal Information, in U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Privacy and Self-
Regulation in the Information Age (1997), available at http'J/www.ntia.doc.govl
reportslprivacy/selfregl.htm.
74. For example, one survey reveals:
The percentage of people who report being aware of any procedures that
allow one to remove one's name from direct mail lists for catalogs, products,
and services has remained constant from 1991 to the present at 44%. ...
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possibility of opting out experience significant- even overwhelming-
difficulties in preventing the collection and sale of data pertaining to
them.75 Elsewhere, I have argued that businesses have the capacity to
inflate transaction costs incurred by consumers in opting out, and, in
some instances at least, reason to do so.76
Until 1980, in its attempt to translate these goals into legal
standards, the FTC used three criteria to decide if a practice was
unfair:
(1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously
considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other
words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common-law,
statutory, or other established concept of unfairness;
(2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous;
Notably, only 29% of those who consider mail offers an invasion of privacy
are aware of the procedures that would allow them to remove their names
from direct mail lists.
1996 Equifax/Harris Consumer Privacy Survey, supra note 16, at 10; see also 1991
Harris-Equifax Consumer Privacy Survey supra note 16, at 18; Alan F. Westin, Louis
Harris & Assocs., Commerce, Communication, and Privacy Online 23 (1997)
(indicating that 57% of computer users aware of procedures that allow them to
remove names from direct mail lists for catalogs, products, and services, and 25% of
online service and internet users who send or receive e-mail know of procedures for
removing their e-mail addresses from companies that send e-mail offers); Mary J.
Culnan, "How Did they Get My Name?": An Exploratory Investigation of Consumer
Attitudes Toward Secondary Information Use, MIS Q., Sept. 1993, at 341, 357
(showing 78% of participants unaware of procedures to allow mailing list removal);
cf. Gerald Tolchin, Personal Privacy and Access to Information on a College Campus:
A Preliminary Report, 29 Psychol. J. Hum. Behav. 12, 14 (1992) (finding that about
half the students surveyed were aware of or seemed to understand certain of their
privacy rights under the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974). On the
willingness of the FTC to intervene in such circumstances Averitt states:
For [a consumer's] decision to be meaningful... it must be based on full and
accurate knowledge of the alternatives. Some sellers have undermined this
process by either withholding or failing to generate critical data about their
products, thus making it difficult or impossible for consumers to make
informed comparisons. The Commission has found these practices to be
unfair under certain circumstances.
See Averitt, supra note 60, at 258.
75. See, e.g., Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, supra note 7, at 1074-76. Anne Wells
Branscomb comments:
[A]ttempting to get out of the clutches of the database managers is almost a
full-time job. I can vouch for this, because I have spent the last five years
trying to withstand the assault of direct mail marketers on the post office box
I rented to relieve the overstuffed mailbox at my home address.
Anne Wells Branscomb, Who Owns Information? 11 (1994); see also Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, Second Annual Report of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 25 (1995)
(illustrating an instance where consumer still received junk mail after having written
over 2,000 letters seeking deletion from mailing lists); G. Bruce Knecht, Junk-Mail
Hater Seeks Profits From Sale of His Name, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1995, at B1
(describing a consumer who for years has requested companies to delete his name
from their mailing lists and still receives one to seven solicitation letters each day).
76. See Sovern, Opting in, Opting Out, supra note 7, at 1081.
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(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers .... 77
However, in 1980, the Commission produced a Policy Statement
which recast the unfairness doctrine as a more economics-oriented
approach, focusing on cost-benefit analysis.78 This Policy Statement
emphasized that the most important of the three criteria was whether
there had been a consumer injury. It then refined the definition of
consumer injury, and Congress ultimately codified this refinement in
1994. The 1994 codification of the unfairness doctrine prohibited the
FTC from barring a practice as unfair "unless the act or practice
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition."7 I now
consider each of these criteria in turn with regard to the sale of
personal information.
1. Substantial Injury
Does the sale of personal information without notice to consumers
amount to a substantial injury? In other areas, small injuries, widely
shared, can qualify.'m The FTC has found in the past that a failure to
disclose other types of information can be unfair.' Nor does it matter
77. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (1964); see also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405
U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972) (listing FTC criteria). For a discussion of unfairness under
the FTC Act generally, see Averitt, supra note 60, at 245; Richard Craswell, The
Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission, 1981
Wis. L. Rev. 107; Ernest Gellhorn, Trading Stamps, S & H, and tire FTC's Unfairness
Doctrine, 1983 Duke L.J. 903; David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at tire FTC:
Misadventures in Law and Economics, 52 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 1,4 (1983).
78. FTC Policy Statement on Fairness, Letter from Michael Pertschuk et al., to
Senators Ford and Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980). reprinted in Dee Pridgen, Consumer
Protection and the Law, 9A-1 app. (2000) [hereinafter 1980 Policy Statement]. The
1980 Policy Statement is discussed in Pridgen, supra, at ch. 9. [hereinafter Pridgen,
Consumer Protection].
79. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, § 9, Pub. L No. 103-312
(1994), 108 Stat. 1691,1695 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1994)).
80. See S. Rep. No. 103-130, at 13 (1994). reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776,
1788; In re Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 362 (1986), afrd, 849 F2d 1354,
1366 (11th Cir. 1988) ("We are not concerned with trivial or merely speculative
harms, but an injury may be substantial if it does a small harm to a large number of
people. Over $7.5 million in increased renewal revenue in an approximately four year
period at the unjustified expense of consumer, is not insubstantial." (footnotes
omitted)); Averitt, supra note 60, at 246.
81. See, e.g., Trade Regulation Rules, 16 C.F.R. § 423 (2000) (stating that the Care
Labeling Rule requires clothing to bear permanent labels on how to care for garment,
such as "cold water wash only" and explained at Care Labeling of Textile Wearing
Apparel, Promulgation of Trade Rule and Statement of Basis and Purpose, 36 Fed.
Reg. 23,883-23,889 (1971) ("It is unduly oppressive and unfair to consumers to
withhold information essential to the ordinary use of a product" because many
consumers experience "substantial economic loss because of erroneous assumptions
about care of clothes")); 16 C.F.R. § 306 (2000). (explained in Posting of Minimum
Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 36
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that the information may be used after the purchase that generated
the information; post-purchase practices can still be unfair.82
Some consumers are not bothered by the trade in their personal
information; 3 presumably, they have not suffered a substantial injury.
But others are troubled by it-some, deeply so-and many are so
concerned that they have invested time and money in trying to stop
the use of their information.' The sale of adults' personal
information without notice may be less injurious than the sale of
information about children-which Congress and the FTC have
Fed. Reg. 23,871, 23,877 (1971) (stating that the rule requires posting of standardized
octane ratings of gasoline to prevent confused consumers from buying more
expensive gasoline with higher octane than necessary; the rule is based on both
unfairness and deception power)). See generally Pridgen, Consumer Protection, supra
note 78, § 9.05[2] (commenting on the Care and Labeling Rule and the FTC rule
requiring the posting of octane ratings).
82. See In re Orkin Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. at 341-42 (ruling that it was an
unfair practice for an exterminating company, contracted for lifetime pest control at
particular rate, to later seek to raise rates); In re Spiegel, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 425, 437
(1975) (holding practice of mail order company of suing consumer in company's home
state rather than consumer's home state was unfair); In re All-State Indus. of N.C.,
Inc., 75 F.T.C. 465, 490 (1969) (finding practice unfair when seller did not disclose to
consumers that it routinely assigned consumer credit contracts to third party, thus
immunizing third party from most consumer claims and defenses and obligating
consumer to pay under holder in due course doctrine even when seller did not
perform).
83. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
84. For example, many consumers pay telephone companies so that their phone
numbers and addresses will not be listed. See Eli M. Noam, Privacy and Self-
Regulation: Markets for Electronic Privacy, in U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Privacy and
Self-Regulation in the Information Age (1997), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfregl.htm (reporting that 55% of
California residences have unlisted numbers while 24% of New York State residents
are not listed). Some 30,000 Americans called, or wrote, to Lotus Development or
Equifax or both when the two proposed to create a product-Marketplace:
Households-which would have made the names, addresses, personal buying habits,
and income levels of many consumers more available to local businesses. Daniel
Mendel-Black & Evelyn Richards, Peering into Private Lives, Wash. Post, Jan. 20,
1991, at H1. The two companies dropped the plan after the protests. See also Evan
Hendricks, Capital Insights, Privacy Times, June 28, 1996, at 1 (discussing how Lexis-
Nexis dropped plan to make consumer Social Security numbers available to
subscribers after complaints); Evan Hendricks, Capital Insights, Privacy Times, May 2,
1996, at 1 (detailing how after receiving complaints, Database America and Yahoo
deleted 90 million unlisted numbers from what was to be a compilation of 175 million
names and addresses); Pac Bell Backs-off Selling Lists, Alameda Times Star, Apr. 16,
1986, at 6 (showing how company reversed decision to sell customer names and
addresses after receiving more than 75,000 customer protests); Seth Schiesel, America
Online Backs Off Plan to Give Out Phone Numbers, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1997, at Dl
(reporting that company abandoned plan to provide lists of phone numbers to
telemarketers and others within 24 hours after plan became widely known and
consumers complained). Many Americans claim they have decided against applying
for something, such as a job, credit, or insurance, to preserve confidentiality of their
data. The 1990 Equifax Report, supra note 16, at 13 (30%). See generally Sovern,
Opting In, Opting Out, supra note 7.
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regulated'-but given the concern that sale has drawn from
consumers, it is difficult to argue that it does not amount to a
substantial injury, at least to many consumers.
However, the legislative history of the 1994 codification offers a
stumbling block in finding the injury substantial. The Senate Report
explains:
In accordance with the FTC's December 17, 1980, letter, substantial
injury is not intended to encompass merely trivial or speculative
harm. In most cases, substantial injury would involve monetary or
economic harm or unwarranted health and safety risks. Emotional
impact and more subjective types of harm alone are not intended to
make an injury unfair.86
The type of injury suffered here may at first glance seem emotional
and subjective. But for many it is more than that. Many consumers
have spent money to protect their privacy. ' Even for those who have
not, however, this may be the rare case in which the injury, though not
monetary or health- or safety-related, is still far more than "trivial or
speculative" and so FTC action is appropriate. Because the Senate
Report closely tracks the 1980 Policy Statement in many respects, it is
useful to look to the Policy Statement to flesh out the meaning of the
phrase, substantial injury. The only example of emotional impact and
other more subjective types of harm provided in the text of the 1980
Policy Statement sheds some light on the FTC's intended meaning.
The Commission wrote: "Thus, for example, the Commission will not
seek to ban an advertisement merely because it offends the tastes or
social beliefs of some viewers .... ."I That type of emotional impact is
so different from the type experienced by consumers in the privacy
context that it suggests that the Commission meant something
altogether different when it wrote of emotional impact.
A footnote to the Policy Statement offers even more aid to those
seeking help from the FTC under the unfairness docrine. That
footnote states: "In an extreme case, however, where tangible injury
could be clearly demonstrated, emotional effects might possibly be
85. See supra note 41.
86. S. Rep. No. 103-130, at 13 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776, 1788.
87. See supra note 84.
88. 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 78, at 6. The remainder of the paragraph
also helps in interpreting the Senate Report:
First of all, the injury must be substantial. The Commission is not concerned
with trivial or merely speculative harms. In most cases a substantial injury
involves monetary harm, as when sellers coerce consumers into purchasing
unwanted goods or services or when consumers buy defective goods or
services on credit but are unable to assert against the creditor claims or
defenses arising from the transaction. Unwarranted health and safety risks
may also support a finding of unfairness. Emotional impact and other more
subjective types of harm, on the other hand, will not ordinarily make a
practice unfair.
Id (footnotes omitted).
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considered as the basis for a finding of unfairness."89 The footnote
then cites, with a cf., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"), and refers specifically to the FDCPA provision barring
harassing late-night telephone calls." The note does not define
"tangible injury." Conceivably, tangible injury means that there must
be some physical manifestation of the emotional effect, as was
required by some older cases in which plaintiffs sought damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.9" But it is more likely that
tangible injury means only that it must be clear that the conduct is of a
sort that causes injury, as the citation to the FDCPA suggests.'
Moreover, the reference to harassing late-night telephone calls seems
remarkably like one of the objectionable characteristics of
telemarketing, and so offers support for the argument that at least
some injuries suffered by consumers at the hands of marketers fall
within the FTC Act's unfairness prong.93
In sum, rather than dismissing the harm to consumers from the
trade in their personal information as merely emotional or subjective,
the better argument is that the injury is substantial.
2. Reasonably Avoiding the Injury
Could consumers reasonably avoid the injury? Consumers who do
not even know that information about them is being used, or how it is
being used, lack the opportunity to avoid the injury. While many
89. Id. at 6 n.16.
90. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994).
Section 1692c bars late night telephone calls while § 1692d prohibits harassment.
91. See generally W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 64 (1984) ("A few
cases have said flatly that physical illness or some other nonmental damage is
essential to the existence of the tort, and there are other cases which look as if it were
considered indispensable. On the other hand, there are numerous decisions which
have found liability for mere mental disturbance without any evidence of physical
consequences." (footnotes omitted)).
92. Under the FDCPA, courts may award statutory damages even when the
consumer fails to prove actual damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (1994) (allowing
statutory damages up to $1,000).
93. Harassing late-night telephone calls are addressed in the FTC's Telemarketing
Rules. See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (e)(1) (2000) (prohibiting telemarketing calls after 9:00
p.m.); 16 C.F.R. § 310.4 (2000) (outlining abusive telemarketing acts or practices that
are barred by the Rule). Those rules do not address the trade in consumer
information.
A problem with relying on the footnote to the Policy Statement is that it was not
carried forward into the Senate Report, which may imply congressional rejection of
the message in the note. But it probably means only that the Senate did not view the
point as important enough to merit congressional attention: it was, after all, confined
to a note. Given Congress's enthusiastic adoption of much of the Policy Statement, I
would hesitate to say that Congress rejected any of it, unless a clearer intent was
demonstrated. See S. Rep. No. 103-130, at 12 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1776, 1787 ("This section is intended to codify, as a statutory limitation on unfair acts
or practices, the principles of the FTC's December 17, 1980 policy statement on
unfairness.").
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consumers know in some general way that the information they
provide in a transaction may be used, it appears that many, if not
most, do not understand just how that information will be exploited.'
In the 1980 Policy Statement, the Commission explained:
[I]t has long been recognized that certain types of sales techniques
may prevent consumers from effectively making their own decisions,
and that corrective action may then become necessary. Most of the
Commission's unfairness matters are brought under these
circumstances. They are brought, not to second-guess the wisdom of
particular consumer decisions, but rather to halt some form of seller
behavior that unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an
obstacle to the free exercise of consumer decisionmaking.9
The lack of complete information, which deprives many consumers
of the opportunity to reasonably avoid injury in the privacy situation,
is analogous to the FTC's In re International Harvester Co. decision. "
Harvester manufactured tractors that were subject to fuel geysering,
the forceful ejection of hot gasoline through a loosened gas cap. The
Conmission found Harvester's failure to notif
, consumers of this
possibility unfair.97 In discussing whether the injury was one that
consumers could reasonably avoid, the Commission wrote:
Farmers may have known that loosening the fuel cap was generally a
poor practice, but they did not know from the limited disclosures
made, nor could they be expected to know from prior experience,
the full consequences that might follow from it. This is therefore not
a situation in which the farmers themselves are primarily responsible
for their own accidents.9
8
Just as in Harvester, consumers' vague knowledge that some of their
information is used by businesses does not permit them to avoid the
injury.
Indeed, the Commission has found this prong satisfied even when
consumers had in their possession a writing that indicated that their
rights were being violated. In the case of In re Orkin Exterminating
Co.," Orkin, an exterminator, offered its customers "lifetime"
contracts at fixed rates. Over the years, inflation jeopardized the
profitability of the arrangement, and Orkin raised its rates. When
some customers objected, Orkin adopted a policy of rescinding the
price rise to complaining customers if the customer could show that it
had relied on Orkin's promise not to increase the fee." Orkin did
not, however, offer a similar arrangement to customers who failed to
94. See supra note 73.
95. 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 78, at 7.
96. 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984).
97. Id. at 1066.
98. Id.
99. 108 F.T.C. 263 (1986), aqd, 849 F.2d 1354 (11 th Cir. 1988).
100. Id. at 286-90, 367.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
complain. The FTC intervened and ultimately determined that the
non-complaining customers could not reasonably have mitigated the
injury they suffered."' In affirming, the Eleventh Circuit observed
that "consumer information is central to this prong of the unfairness
inquiry."" If consumers could not protect themselves in the Orkin
and Harvester cases, then surely consumers are in no better position to
prevent the unauthorized use of their personal information.t°l
3. Is the Injury Outweighed by Countervailing Benefits?
The third prong of the unfairness test is whether the injury is
outweighed by any countervailing benefits. The FTC has also
characterized this inquiry as whether the conduct is harmful "in its net
effects."'" The issue here is not whether firms are using personal
information, but rather whether the failure to disclose the possibility
that information will be used causes an injury that outweighs the
benefits of nondisclosure.
I have argued elsewhere that our existing system-where failures to
disclose to consumers the nature of information practices are
commonplace-is generally harmful in that it prevents consumers
from acting consistently with their preferences and thus produces a
suboptimal equilibrium.0 5 The failure to disclose makes it impossible
for some consumers to protect their privacy, and there is ample reason
to believe that some consumers are deeply troubled by the use of their
personal information.' 6 Moreover, the benefits of nondisclosure do
not seem great. Indeed it is difficult to argue that disclosure is
troublesome, as even trade groups are now calling for disclosure of
the uses to which the information will be put and making opt-out
devices available.a0 Hence, given that the injury is significant to some
and the benefits of non-disclosure seem slight, this prong comes out in
favor of disclosure.08
101. Id. at 366-68.
102. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1366 (11th Cir. 1988).
103. See also In re Amrep Corp., 102 F.T.C. 1362 (1983) (finding that buyers of
land located far away from their homes could not reasonably avoid injury because
they lacked information about subdivisions in question).
104. In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1061 (1984) ("In analyzing an
omission this part of the unfairness analysis requires us to balance gainst the risks of
injury the costs of notification and the costs of determining what the prevailing
consumer misconceptions actually are."); see also S. Rep. No. 103-130, at 13 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1776, 1788; cf In re Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 105
F.T.C 7, 154 (1985) ("There can be no benefit to society from the dissemination of
misrepresentations that induce consumers to continue making payments that they
might very well have terminated if they had not been misinformed.").
105. See generally Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, supra note 7.
106. See supra note 17.
107. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
108. Richard Craswell has synthesized the FTC unfairness decisions dealing with
non-disclosure as follows:
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Does it matter that the offending practice is widely-practiced or
represents customary business conduct? Apparently not: the FTC
has intervened to bar industry-wide conduct as well as practices that
had existed for decades. 9
C. Deception
FTC rulings have made it more difficult to argue that undisclosed
sales of personal information are deceptive than to argue that those
sales are unfair. In a 1983 Policy Statement, the FTC toughened its
standard of deception. The FTC now considers conduct deceptive "if
there is a representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead
the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the
consumer's detriment."110  The conduct must also qualify as
[T]he Commission's decisions suggest that the failure to disclose
information... will be unfair if. (1) consumers currently lack the
information in question; (2) consumers would choose differently if they had
the information, thus facing sellers with a different set of demand curves;
and (3) the benefits of better consumer decisions and improved seller
performance are not outweighed by the costs of supplying the information.
Craswell, supra note 77, at 123. The undisclosed use of personal information seems to
meet that standard.
109. See, e.g., Moog Indus., Inc., v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411,413 (1958) (affirming FTC's
regulatory authority to end price discrimination within industry); FTC v. Algoma
Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 79 (1934) (noting that although sellers called wood by
botanically-incorrect name for forty years or more, the FTC still rightfully exercised
its authority to prevent misbranding); In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1563
n.12 (1975) (rejecting defense that it was a common practice among car dealers to
drop a deceptive service charge if a consumer complained).
110. Letter from James C. Miller, III, FTC Chair, to Senator Bob Packwood 5
(Oct. 14, 1983), in 45 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 689, 690 (1983)
[hereinafter FTC 1983 Policy Statement]. See generally Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v.
FTC, 785 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that failure to disclose, in connection with
land sales, violated FTC Act); Carol T. Crawford, Unfairness and Deception Policy at
the FTC: Clarifying the Commission's Role and Rules, 54 Antitrust L.J. 303 (1985)
(discussing developments in Commission's unfairness and deception policies);
William W. Jacobs, Consumer Litigation and Its Relationship to the Federal Trade
Commission's "Unfairness" and "Deception" Standards, 16 U. Tol. L Rev. 903 (1984)
(relating developments in FTC policy to Ohio consumer litigation); Jack E. Karns &
Alan C. Roline, The Federal Trade Comnission s Deception Policy in the Ne-t
Millenium: Evaluating the Subjective Impact of Cliffdale Associates, 74 N.D .L. Rev.
441 (1998) (assessing 1983 restatement of reasonable consumer in deception
standard); Jack E. Karns, The Federal Trade Commission's Evolving Deception
Policy, 22 U. Rich. L. Rev. 399 (1988) (analyzing decisions following enactment of
1983 policy); Roger E. Schecter, The Death of the Gullible Consurner Towards a
More Sensible Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 U. Ill. L Rev. 571 (urging the
adoption of a "multi-tiered" approach to defining deception); E. Thomas Sullivan &
Brian A. Marks, The FTC's Deceptive Advertising Policy: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 64 Or. L. Rev. 593 (1986) (analyzing the change in standard from a legal and
economic perspective, focusing on incentives, burden allocation, transaction costs and
welfare tradeoffs); Oxendale, supra note 61 (tracing the standard change to divergent
views on the correct approach to protecting consumers); Dale Pollak & Bruce
Teichner, Comment, The Federal Trade Commission's Deception Enforcement Policy,
35 DePaul L. Rev. 125 (1985) (examining the impact of the FTC's reformulated
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material."n No showing is required that the manufacturer made a
false statement,'1 2 or that any deception was intended,"3 or that
anyone was deceived" 4 or even injured."5
Examples discussed previously, wherein a consumer's request for a
free sample results in the consumer's name being sold on a list of
those who are incontinent,'1 6 a consumer's stay in a lodge causes the
consumer to be liste.d as having a particular sexual orientation," 7 or a
consumer's purchase of software results in the consumer's personal
information becoming available to others' without the consumer's
knowledge, all sound like omissions "that [are] likely to mislead the
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances."" 9 Few consumers
would anticipate those particular consequences of such behavior.
Of course, much information collected from consumers that is sold
is not used in such an extreme fashion. But even in other situations,
unexplained use may satisfy the test for deception. As noted above,
many consumers simply do not know how their personal information
is used. 2 0  How many consumers must be misled before their
confusion can be said to be reasonable? The Commission has
explained that "[a]n interpretation may be reasonable even though it
is not shared by a majority of consumers in the relevant class, or by
particularly sophisticated consumers. A material practice that
misleads a significant minority of reasonable consumers is
deceptive.'' 1 It seems very likely that the information practices of
many companies meet that standard.
Is the deception to the consumer's detriment? Again, while some
consumers would not find it objectionable, many would. The failure
to disclose here is analogous to a seller's failure to disclose that the
definition of deception on FTC proceedings).
111. FTC 1983 Policy Statement, supra note 110, at 5.
112 Statements can be deceptive even though they are literally true. See, e.g.,
Bockenstette v. FTC, 134 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir. 1943) ("Words and sentences may
be literally and technically true and yet be framed in such a setting as to mislead or
deceive."); In re Thompson Med. Co., 104 F.T.C. 648, 788 (1984) (noting that the
crucial issue was whether claims were likely to mislead reasonable consumers).
113. FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963) ("[Plroof of
intention to deceive is not requisite to a finding of violation of the statute."); see also
Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. at 81; Richard A. Schulman, Little F.T.C. Act. The
Neglected Alternative, 9 J. Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 351, 361 (1975-1976).
114. See Resort Car Rental Sys. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1975);
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967); Charles of
the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944).
115. See FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942); Sterling Drug Inc., 317 F.2d
at 674.
116. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
119. FTC 1983 Policy Statement, supra note 110, at 5.
120. See supra note 73.
121. In re Kraft, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 40, 122 (1991).
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consumer's promissory note or contract might be sold in the regular
course of business-and the FTC has ruled that deceptive.12-
Whether the FTC would view the conduct as deceptive is likely to
depend on whether the failure to disclose the manner in which the
consumer's information is being used is seen as a half-truth or a "pure
omission." While the Commission offers only slight protection against
deceptive "pure omissions," the FTC has ruled many times that half-
truths fall afoul of the FTC Act." An example: the FTC acted to bar
Kraft from advertising-truthfully-that each slice of its cheese was
made from five ounces of milk, when the ads did not disclose that
thirty percent of the calcium in the milk was lost during processing.2'2
The ads had also pointed out-again, truthfully-the value of calcium
in building bones. 12 Though it is a bit of a stretch, the Commission
could, if it wanted to, see as a half-truth a seller's description of the
offer as an exchange of a product for money rather than an exchange
of a product for money plus information. "
The FTC formerly viewed a merchant's failure to correct a
consumer's normal, but erroneous expectations about a product as
deceptive, even in situations in which the seller had not spoken-the
so-called "pure omission."127  For example, the FTC has taken the
position that a seller acted deceptively when the seller sold 1970
model year cars in that model year or the following year at nearly full
price without disclosing that the cars were used, given that consumers
122. All-State Indus. of N.C., Inc., v. FTC. 423 F.2d 423.425 (4th Cir. 1970).
123. See, e.g., In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1057 (1984) ("[Ilt can be
deceptive to tell only half the truth, and to omit the rest."), see also Nat'l Bakers
Servs., v. FIC, 329 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1964) (holding that a baker's truthful
advertisement that its bread contained "only 46 calories per slice" was found
deceptive because it created the illusion that the bread was a special diet food, when
in fact the bread was only sliced more thinly than other breads).
124. See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992).
125. Id.
126. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 2402 ("[Tlhe typical transaction between a
merchant or seller and a consumer increasingly can be characterized as an exchange
of goods or services for money and information.").
127. See, e.g., Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, Trade
Regulation Rule, Funeral Industry Practices. 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260, 42.274-77 (1982)
(declaring that the FTC sees as deceptive, failure of funeral directors to correct
consumer misconceptions about need for embalming and need for caskets for
cremation even though funeral directors themselves did not create misconceptions);
Statement of Basis and Purpose, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8,324. 8,352
(1964) ("The principle crystallized in [cases] is that Section 5 [of the FTC Act] forbids
sellers to exploit the normal expectations of consumers in order to deceive just as it
forbids sellers to create false expectations by affirmative acts."). See generally
Pridgen, Consumer Protection, supra note 78, § 10.07 (discussing the concept and
consequence of deception by omission): Ivan L Preston. The Federal Trade
Commission's Identification of Implications as Constituting Deceptive Advertising, 57
U. Cin. L. Rev. 1243, 1277-81 (1989) (addressing product claims that contain no
explicit qualifications, and thus falsely imply that no material qualifications exist).
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would normally expect cars sold in such circumstances to be new. 28 In
the privacy context, such normal but incorrect expectations probably
also arise. For example, many consumers provide the personal
information sought on warranty cards. Some probably assume that
the information is needed to register the purchase, but in fact much of
the information is instead used to generate data about consumers that
can be used for marketing purposes.129
In recent years, however, the Commission has been less protective
of consumers when it finds the omission before it to constitute a "pure
omission" rather than a half-truth. 130  In the controversial 1984
International Harvester decision, in which it found an omission unfair
but not deceptive, the Commission wrote that because of the many
misconceptions different consumers might have about a variety of
matters, some of them bound to be idiosyncratic, "it would be both
impractical and very costly to require corrective information on all
such points."'' However, the FTC will continue to view a business's
behavior as deceptive if the business is silent "under circumstances
128. In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1552, 1557-58 (1975); see also In re
Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 87 F.T.C. 1184, 1230 (1976) ("It is deceptive.., to fail to
disclose in advertisements promoting [a] weight reduction program that the
treatments employ prescription drugs not approved for weight reduction by FDA.
Some consumers will reasonably believe, and indeed have a right to assume, that
controls are exercised by the government over the promotion and use of prescription
drugs.").
129. See, e.g., Joshua Quittner, Invasion of Privacy, Time, Aug. 25, 1997, at 33
("Think twice before filling out warranty cards or entering sweepstakes. These are
data mines for marketers. Besides, most products are guaranteed by your sales
receipt."). O'Harrow states:
An Arkansas company that provides information to marketers has
amassed 135 million consumer telephone numbers-including about 20
million that are unlisted-to help identify and profile people who call toll-
free lines to shop or make an inquiry.
When someone makes a toll-free call to a client of Acxiom Corp. of
Conway, Ark., a telemarketing agent can learn who the caller is and where
he or she lives, even before answering the call. The agent also can often find
out the kind of home the caller lives in, the type of cars the people in that
household drive, whether they exercise-even whether they own a cat....
Company officials won't detail exactly how they gather the 20 million
unlisted numbers, which they said represent about half of all unlisted
numbers in the nation. They acknowledged that some of the information
comes from "self-reported sources." Industry specialists said that could
include surveys, product registration cards and credit card applications.
O'Harrow, A Hidden Toll, supra note 2.
130. See In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1059-60 (1984) ("[Plure
omissions are not appropriately characterized as deceptive or reached through
deception analysis .... However, the Commission does not treat pure omissions as
deceplive.").
131. Id. at 1059. The decision is sharply criticized in Greenfield, supra note 72, at
81-84.
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that constitute an implied but false representation . .. [which] may
arise from ... the circumstances of a specific transaction."'"
Is the omission here, where personal data provided by the consumer
is put to other uses, such as compiling marketing lists, more properly
characterized as a half-truth or a pure omission? If you use the
standard meanings of those phrases, it is probably a pure omission.
But even if this is the case, the omission should still be seen as
deceptive. This is not the situation at which the pure omission
standard seems aimed, where many consumers have different
expectations of what would be disclosed. Rather, we know from the
available evidence that many consumers have the same expectation-
that their information will not be sold-and that that expectation is
not being met. In any event, given the ambiguity, a better focus would
not be on what type of omission this is, but on whether the conduct in
question is in fact deceptive, and so should be regulated. As discussed
above, it frequently is deceptive. Consumers acting reasonably in
consumer transactions are often unaware of the uses to which their
personal information is being put. Hence the FTC could, if it wishes,
intervene.
For the trade in consumer information to constitute deception, it
would also have to meet the materiality requirement. Something is
material if it is "likely to affect consumers' conduct or decision Nvith
regard to a product."'33 If consumers have been honest about what
they are telling the pollsters, then we know that the trade in consumer
information has affected some consumers' purchasing decisions., -' It
thus appears that the materiality requirement is satisfied.
132. Int7 Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1058. In In re Figgie Int'l, I., the Commission
offered an example of an implied representation, stating: "the very act of offering
goods for sale creates an implied representation that the goods are reasonably fit for
their intended uses and free of gross safety hazards." 107 F.T.C. 313, 379 n.17 {1986).
One author argues that sellers should have obligations to disclose under state
deceptive trade practices statutes,
when an information source knows or has reason to know that disclosure of
a fact would correct a mistake about a basic assumption upon which the
other party is operating in entering into a transaction ... [or] when an
information source knows or has reason to know that there is a high
probability that a buyer is ignorant of a fact that the buyer subjectively
believes is material to the transaction and the information source can
provide information about the fact efficiently and at a lower cost than the
buyer.
Thomas J. Holdych, Standards for Establishing Deceptive Conduct Under State
Deceptive Trade Practices Statutes that Impose Punitive Remedies, 73 Or. L Rev. 235,
294 (1994).
133. Int7 Harvester, 104 F.T.C. at 1056; see also In re Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 105
F.T.C. 7, 149 (1985).
134. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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D. FTC Privacy Interventions
The FTC has occasionally intervened to remedy misbehavior in
information practices. Recently, the FTC acted to prevent companies
from affirmatively misrepresenting their information practices, 3 5 and
filed suit to prevent an information broker from obtaining personal
information about consumers under false pretenses by, for example,
calling a bank and pretending to be the depositor to learn financial
information.'36 In another case, the FTC reached a consent agreement
with a company that had sent deceptive unsolicited commercial e-mail
using e-mail addresses it had harvested from a competitor's Web site;
the company agreed to refrain from such practices in the future,
among other things. 37 In older cases, discussed below, the FTC
stepped in when a merchant attempted to use personal information
seemingly collected for one purpose, for a different purpose.
An example of one of these older cases is In re Metromedia, Inc., a
case that terminated in a consent order.38  Metromedia had sent
consumers a form letter along with a questionnaire and invited them
to complete and return the questionnaire to be eligible for prizes. The
mailing explained that the questionnaire "is being sent to a number of
people in your area to obtain information about habits and
characteristics of people living in different sections of the country."' 9
It added, "[t]here is nothing to buy, and we assure you that no
salesman will call on you."14'
In fact, Metromedia had sent the mailing to generate lists for direct
mail solicitations. The FTC's complaint charged Metromedia with
representing, either directly or impliedly, that the purpose of the
mailing was for something other than selling goods and services, and
that respondents would not be solicited to buy things.'4' It viewed that
as deceptive. 142
The FTC also claimed that Metromedia had behaved both
deceptively and unfairly in:
135. See supra note 66.
136. See Stipulated Consent Agreement and Final Order, FTC v. Rapp, No. 99-
WM-783, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9904/touchtonecomplaint.htm (last visited Jan.
8, 2001) [hereinafter, Consent Agreement, FTC v. Rapp]. The complaint, together
with a press release and statements by the Commissioners are available at the FTC's
web site, www.ftc.gov. The Commission statements refer to the case as Touch Tone
Information, Inc.. See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, In re
Touch Tone Info., No. 982-3619, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9904/
touchtoneswindlestatement.htm (Apr. 29, 1999) [hereinafter, Swindle Dissenting
Statement, In re Touch Tone Info.]
137. Consent Agreement, FTC v. ReverseAuction.Com, Inc., supra note 69.
138. In re Metromedia, Inc, 78 F.T.C. 331 (1971). The FTC's order notes that
Metromedia did not admit wrongdoing.
139. Id. at 333.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 337.
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seek[ing] to elicit responses in the manner aforesaid and to fail to
disclose clearly and conspicuously the purpose for which the
information contained on said questionnaire was being requested,
and to fail to disclose that it was in the business of compiling mailing
lists which are for sale or rent to mail-order advertisers and sellers of
merchandise and services, and that the information requested would
be used, together with the name and address of the addressee in the
compiling of such lists. 4 3
The complaint also acknowledged the significance of the consumer
interest in privacy:
A substantial portion of the purchasing public has a preference that
their names not appear on mailing lists. This preference arises out
of various individual and personal reasons such as, but not limited
to, the unauthorized invasion of personal privacy; being subjected to
the repeated importuning of promoters, advertisers and sellers of
merchandise, services and schemes, and being exploited by
respondent and the users of said... mailing list."M
Normally a complaint is of no precedential value whatever. But, as
discussed above, FTC consent orders are in a different category."5 At
a minimum, the complaint and consent order indicate that the FTC
thought the challenged conduct, if proven, would have violated the
FTC Act. To be sure, Metromedia's actions are arguably
distinguishable from the conduct discussed in this article. Metromedia
allegedly sought to create an impression at odds with its true purpose,
while the sellers of consumer information today often do not do that;
they simply use information obtained in one transaction for another.
But it is a short step from saying that sellers who seek information for
direct mail solicitations cannot say what Metromedia supposedly
did-that they want information about habits and characteristics of
people, and that no salesperson will call on the consumer-to saying
that merchants who wish to use information about consumers, and
who know that the consumers have misconceptions about what will be
done with their personal information, must dispel those
misconceptions.
Another vintage case sheds further light on FTC information
jurisprudence. During the sixties, Beneficial, a lender, entered the tax
preparation business, motivated in part to generate customers for its
loan business."4 At first, Beneficial used the information provided by
the taxpayer to solicit the taxpayer to borrow from Beneficial; for
example, Beneficial, having learned from the taxpayer what loans the
taxpayer had, might urge the taxpayer to consolidate debts with a
143. Id.
144. Id
145. See supra note 66.
146. In re Beneficial Corp., 86 F.T.C. 119, 168 (1975). The matter ultimately
concluded in a consent order. In re Beneficial Corp.. 94 F.T.C. 425 (1979).
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Beneficial loan.147 After Congress passed a statute making it a crime
for commercial tax-preparers to use taxpayer data for non-tax
purposes without the taxpayer's consent,148 Beneficial adopted
procedures designed to generate loan customers without violating the
criminal statute. Thus, Beneficial required tax preparation customers
to fill out a form authorizing Beneficial to solicit the customer for
"any business" in which Beneficial might engage and to agree that
information appearing on a loan application was not given for tax
preparation.
149
Using pre-1980 standards, the Commission found Beneficial's
conduct unfair, noting that "[p]ersonal financial data is the private
business of the individual to whom it relates."'5 ° Though the FTC
focused especially on the nature of tax confidentiality, in a note it
observed:
In light of the pervasive and specific policy of tax confidentiality,
we... have no need to decide whether a broader consideration of
personal privacy could govern this case. In declining to reach that
issue, however, we do not suggest that a generalized right of
personal privacy and personal control over private data is an
inadequate foundation on which to ground a finding of unlawfulness
under Section 5. In fact, the right of privacy has become a widely-
valued public policy, with constitutional and statutory underpinning
... .Its violation in a commercial context would likely be unlawful
under the Federal Trade Commission Act.15'
The FTC also found Beneficial's conduct deceptive. Using the pre-
1983 standards for deception, the Commission wrote:
Although the public expects the fiduciary character of a taxpayer-
tax preparer relationship to be honored, Beneficial entered such
relationships with no intention of guarding tax information from
unauthorized use, and in fact converted tax data for its own profit.
Beneficial's failure to disclose these conditions had the capacity to
mislead consumers into believing that the information they provided
would only be used for preparing their tax returns. Such an
omission of facts which are material to an intelligent purchasing
decision is unlawful ....
147. In re Beneficial Corp., 86 F.T.C. at 169.
148. Revenue Act of 1971 § 316,26 U.S.C. § 7216 (1994)
149. In re Beneficial Corp., 86 F.T.C. at 169.
150. Id. at 172.
151. Id. at 172, n.9.
152. Id. at 173. In another case, In re H & R Block, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 304 (1972), the
FTC entered into a consent order prohibiting a tax preparer from using customer
information obtained through the tax preparation process for purposes unrelated to
preparation of tax returns, except with the consent of the taxpayer. The complaint
alleged that H & R Block had provided the information to other entities which used
the information to solicit consumers. By entering into the settlement, H & R Block
did not admit that it had violated the law. The consent order was modified later in
light of the enactment of 26 U.S.C. § 7216. In re H & R Block, 100 F.T.C. 523 (1982).
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A later decision casts doubt on how broadly Beneficial can be read.
Beltone, a manufacturer of hearing aids, required dealers whose
relationship to Beltone was terminated to supply to Beltone the
names and addresses of customers to whom they had sold a Beltone
product.153 The administrative law judge found this an unfair practice,
citing Beneficial, and analogizing the relationship between hearing aid
users and dealers to that between physician and patient. The
Commission reversed, finding Beneficial distinguishable. It saw
Beneficial as based on two things. The first was a breach of "the
widely recognized and manifested concern for the confidentiality of
individual tax information .... ,1- In Beltone, by contrast, the FTC
wrote that "whatever public policy exists favoring preservation of
confidentiality in the user-dealer relationship, it does not nearly
approximate the broad policy and statutory mandate that provided
the basis for the Beneficial decision."' 5 -
Second, the Commission viewed Beneficial as resting on a
deliberate breach of a fiduciary relationship. It apparently found no
such breach in Beltone. The Commission noted also the absence of a
record to justify an inference of consumer injury: "While we do not
necessarily endorse the practice of rental of hearing aid customer
names (a practice that ceased in 1973), there is insufficient
information in this record upon which to find substantial injury
resulting from it."'156 In a footnote, the Commission identified a third
distinction from Beneficial: the only information transmitted to the
manufacturer in Beltone was the customer's name, while in Beneficial,
the loan division had access to all of the information in the tax
returns.157
Beltone offers ambiguous support to those trading in consumer
information. Conventional information transfers among merchants,
like those in Beltone, do not implicate a fiduciary relationship or
involve tax returns. On the other hand, many sales of consumer
information involve considerably more information than a consumer's
name and address. Sometimes the information conveyed is as private
as the information contained in tax returns. Some regard information
about a person's likes and dislikes, their religion and sexual
orientation, and their purchases as highly personal. If an attempt
were made to demonstrate injury to consumers from the disclosure of
information-an attempt which could well succeed given the survey
For a discussion of the effect of FrC consent orders, see supra note 66.
153. In re Beltone Elecs. Corp., 100 F.T.C. 68 (1982).
154. Id. at 220.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 220, n. 67. Beneficial is also distinguishable from the situations described
in this article in another respect: the company seemed involved in a scheme intended
to circumvent an explicit federal statute. Moreover, Beneficial was decided using
outmoded standards. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
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data now available158- the Commission could, if it were so inclined,
find Beltone distinguishable. 159
The Commissioners recently had occasion to debate the scope of
Beneficial. When the Commission filed suit in FTC v. Rapp,16° in
which the FTC accused the defendants of having wrongfully identified
themselves to financial institutions as account holders to obtain
personal information for sale to others, Commissioner Swindle
dissented. The remaining Commissioners, Chairman Pitofsky,
Commissioners Anthony and Thompson, issued a statement
explaining their decision to initiate the suit, noting that "we have
previously recognized that the misuse of certain types of private
financial information can be 'legally unfair,' [citing Beneficial]. Thus,
no new theory of consumer injury is advanced here."'' Thus, three
Commissioners view Beneficial as relevant to information practices
beyond tax return information.
Commissioner Swindle found the citation of Beneficial inapposite,
arguing that Beneficial was based on the fiduciary relationship
between the customer and tax preparer. 162 Commissioner Swindle
158. See supra notes 17-18, 84.
159. Beltone may also be distinguishable from the common situation in which
information is sold by one company to another in that the relationship between
manufacturer and dealer is closer than that between two unaffiliated companies
whose only business dealings involve the sale of information.
160. Complaint for Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Rapp, No. 99-
WM-783, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9904/touchtonecomplaint.htm (Apr. 22, 1999)
[hereinafter Complaint, FTC v. Rapp]. The case terminated in a settlement. In the
Stipulated Consent Agreement and Final Order, the court found that "[tihe
Complaint states a claim upon which injunctive relief may be granted against the
defendants under.., the FTC Act .... but also stated that "[tIhis agreement is for
settlement purposes only and does not constitute an admission by defendants that the
law has been violated as alleged in the Complaint or that the facts as alleged in the
Complaint, other than jurisdictional facts, are true." Consent Agreement, FTC v.
Rapp, supra note 136. After the FTC brought the case, Congress enacted a statute
limiting to certain circumstances the practice of misrepresenting oneself to obtain
financial information, also known as "pretexting." See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, §
521, Pub. L. No. 102-106, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A § 6821 (Supp.
2000)); cf Commonwealth v. Source One Assocs., 1999 WL 975120, at *12 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1999) ("[O]btaining private financial information by pretext for the resale
to others in the circumstances found here constitutes unfair and deceptive acts in
trade or commerce.").
161. Statement of Chairman Pitofsky and Commissioners Anthony and Thompson,
In re Touch Tone Info., No. 982-3619, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9904/
majoritystatement.htm (Apr. 22, 1999). The complaint charged the defendants with
having engaged in both unfair and deceptive trade practices, See Complaint, FTC v.
Rapp, supra note 160.
162. Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle, In re Touch Tone Info., No. 982-
3619, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9904/touchtoneswindlestatement.htm. (Apr. 22,
1999). Regarding the Commission's decision to file a complaint in Rapp,
Commissioner Swindle also wrote: "I am concerned that this case represents a foray
into broader privacy regulation." Id. When the case settled, see supra, note 136,
Commissioner Swindle also dissented. Swindle Dissenting Statement, In re Touch
Tone Info., supra note 136.
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also questioned Beneficial's precedential value in light of the changes
in the FTC Act since the case was decided. However, in remarks
delivered to the Direct Marketing Association Government Affairs
Conference, Commissioner Swindle warned that Rapp "'advances a
new theory of consumer injury based solely on the disclosure of
'private' financial information" and that the case "could establish the
principle that an invasion of a consumer's privacy is injury, with no
need to show that any substantial resulting harm to the consumer is
likely. 1163
Another recent case sheds additional light on the Commission's use
of its unfairness power to protect consumer privacy. An online
auction house, ReverseAuction.com, sent deceptive e-mails soliciting
business to e-mail addresses it had harvested from eBay, a competitor
site. This violated the eBay User Agreement-to which
ReverseAuction had apparently subscribed-which prohibits eBay
users from employing information obtained from the eBay site for
sending unsolicited commercial e-mail. The FTC charged
ReverseAuction with engaging in both deceptive and unfair
practices. 164 ReverseAuction and the FTC entered into a consent
agreement under which ReverseAuction agreed to refrain from
similar practices in the future and to provide certain notices both to
those it had solicited and on its Web site."6
FTC Commissioners Swindle and Leary filed a Statement in which
they both concurred and dissented.' While they agreed that
ReverseAuction had acted deceptively, the Commissioners concluded
that ReverseAuction's use of eBay's user information did not rise to
the level of a substantial injury within the meaning of the statute, and
so did not violate the unfairness prong of the FTC Act. The two
Commissioners repeated the language that appeared in the FTC
Policy Statement on unfairness and was carried forward into the 1994
Senate Report on the amendments to the FTC Act, about trivial or
speculative harms." And, they explained:
163. Orson Swindle, Address to the Direct Marketing Association Government
Affairs Conference, at http:/www.ftc.govlspeechesfswindleldma-3.htm (May 6, 1999).
164. Complaint For Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v.
ReverseAuction.com, Inc., at http://www.ftc.gov/os2000/01Ireversecmp.htm (last
visited Jan. 8,2001).
165. Consent Agreement, FTC v. ReverseAuction.com. supra note 69.
ReverseAuction later reportedly settled with eBay, agreeing to pay eBay SI.2 million
and to stop harvesting e-mail addresses. See Oscar S. Cisneros, Spainmer Pays Up at
EBay, at http://vww.wired.com/newsfbusiness0.1367,37852,00.htm (July 28, 2000).
166. Statement of Commissioners Orson Swindle and Thomas B. Leary Concurring
in Part and Dissenting in Part, ReverseAuction.com, Inc., No. 0023046, at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reversesl.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter
Swvindle & Leary Statement, FTC v. ReverseAuction.com].
167. See text accompanying supra note 86. Commissioners Swindle and Leary
noted:
The Commission is not concerned with trivial or merely speculative harms.
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Consumers do not have a substantial privacy interest in the e-mail
addresses and other information that ReverseAuction harvested
since consumers had already agreed to make this information
available to millions of other eBay members (albeit with restrictions
on using it for commercial solicitations). Moreover, a substantial
portion of this information is available without restriction to non-
members who visit eBay's web site. Merely obtaining consumers' e-
mail addresses without their explicit consent and sending them e-
mail solicitations does not cause substantial injury.... This standard
for substantial injury overstates the appropriate level of
government-enforced privacy protection on the Internet, and
provides no rationale for when unsolicited commercial e-mail is
unfair and when it is not. We are troubled by the possibility of an
expansive and unwarranted use of the unfairness doctrine.1
68
The pair left the door open to other unfairness-based privacy cases,
however, noting that "[w]e do not say that privacy concerns can never
support an unfairness claim."' 69
Commissioner Thompson responded that an unfairness claim was
more appropriate than a deception claim. 7 He explained that:
the harm caused in this case is especially significant because it not
only breached the privacy expectation of each and every eBay
member, it also undermined consumer confidence in eBay and
diminishes the electronic marketplace for all its participants. This
injury is exacerbated because consumer concern about privacy and
confidence in the electronic marketplace are such critical issues at
this time.171
Addressing the quote from the Policy Statement, Commissioner
Thompson wrote that "the injury caused by ReverseAuction's
conduct, far from being speculative, is a tangible misappropriation of
personal protected information that enabled the company to send
personalized deceptive e-mail messages to scores of consumers. "172
ReverseAuction thus significantly supports those who believe that
invasions of privacy can cause substantial injury within the meaning of
In most cases a substantial injury involves monetary harm .... Unwarranted
health and safety risks may also support a finding of unfairness. Emotional
impact and other more subjective types of harm, on the other hand, will not
ordinarily make a practice unfair.
Swindle & Leary Statement, FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, supra note 166.
168. Swindle & Leary Statement, FTC v Reverseauction.com, supra note 166
(citation omitted).
169. Id.
170. Statement of Commissioner Mozelle W. Thompson, FTC v.
ReverseAuction.com, Inc., No. 0023046, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/0l/
reversemt.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2001).
171. Id. Commissioner Thompson also wrote, in connection with the standards for
unfairness, that "the injury could not have been avoided by those members [of eBay],
and it was not outweighed by countervailing benefits." Id.
172. Id.
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the FTC Act. But it does not necessarily mean that all privacy
invasions come within that statute. In his statement, Commissioner
Thompson limited the scope of the case. He wrote:
[T]he Commission does not here declare that sending unsolicited
commercial e-mail ... is unfair in all circumstances, nor does it
suggest that privacy invasions cause substantial injury in all
circumstances. Instead, the Commission posits that, under the facts
presented here, it is unfair for ReverseAuction to improperly obtain
personal information for its use. Accordingly, a majority of the
Commission believes that the specific relationship, obligations, and
expectations of this electronic community make ReverseAuction's
behavior "unfair" under Section 5.173
Still, ReverseAuction may serve as a springboard to find privacy
violations in many other situations. Probably few eBay users read the
User Agreement, and so it is likely that many users were unaware of
the protections afforded their privacy by that agreement. Even those
who read the agreement might not have expected other users to
adhere to the privacy protections it promised. E-mail direct
marketers are notorious for misbehavior, often ignoring requests to be
removed from e-mail marketing lists and sometimes even flaming
those who make such requests.74 Thus, many consumers who
provided their e-mail address to eBay may have expected it to be
treated even less privately than information obtained about them in
other consumer transactions. After all, as Commissioners Swvindle
and Leary pointed out, consumer information is not normally
available to millions of others, unlike information posted on Ebay. 5
If using an e-mail address that is available to millions to solicit
business constitutes a substantial injury, wouldn't using much more
private information-such as urinary incontinence-which is not
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., FTC, Public Workshop on Consumer Information Privacy Session
Two: Consumer Online Privacy 11 (June 12, 1997), available at
http:/lwww.ftc.govlbcplprivacy/wkshp97/index.html (remarks of Jason Catlett, Chief
Executive Officer, Junkbusters Corp., stating that some spammers "actually maintain
their own pseudo-remove addresses but simply use the results as an additional source
of addresses to spam"). One article on information privacy warns:
Spammers often punish those who try to opt out of getting unsolicited e-mail
by "flaming" them-sending them nasty messages online, sometimes in
overwhelming numbers. Just ask David Aronson, a Dulles, Va. software
engineer and outspoken span critic. On top of the 20-odd spares he receives
at work and home on an average day, Aronson showed MONEY a stream of
filthy, utterly unprintable flames from someone who described himself as a
"gay atheist commie spammer." Warns Aronson: "Never, ever reply directly
to spammers. It tells them your e-mail address is valid. They will sell it, and
you'll get more spam."
Dowd, Protect Your Privacy, supra note 2, at 110.
175. Swindle & Leary Statement, FTC v. ReverseAuction.com, supra note 166.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
known by the consumer to be available to others, also constitute a
substantial injury? 176
In sum, putting together Beneficial, Rapp, Metromedia, and
ReverseAuction yields a number of precedents for FTC intervention in
transactions involving consumer information. In one -
ReverseAuction-the path to a misrepresentation seems fairly
attenuated, depending on a promise made not to those whose e-mail
addresses were used, but rather in a User Agreement with eBay,
which had in turn asked those whose information was used to enter
into the same form Agreement, which the consumers might not even
have remembered. In Metromedia, the misrepresentation merely
made express what consumers often assume-that by providing
personal information, they are not facilitating their own solicitation.
If the FTC has the power to step into these cases, as it surely does, it is
hard to deny it also has the power to intervene in cases in which
consumers are misled by sharing commonly-held assumptions.
Should the FTC exercise that power? That question is bound up
with issues of resources and politics. As for the resources issue, given
the Commission's scarce resources, it must make choices about which
matters merit its attention, and certainly the Commission could find
other matters that it regards as more critical. But privacy is important
as well, and the FTC has already turned its attention to privacy.
The political aspects of the issue are far more complex and beyond
the scope of this article.' Ideally, a matter that concerns consumer
preferences would be resolved by the legislature, the body best
equipped to convert popular preferences to policy judgments.
Legislators have in fact introduced bills, and some have made progress
towards becoming law. 7 But if Congress fails to act, as it has to date,
176. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
177. For a fascinating discussion of the politics behind some of the FTC's actions,
see Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC's Consumer Protection Program During the Miller
Years: Lessons for Administrative Agency Structure and Operation, 46 Cath. U. L.
Rev. 371 (1997).
178. See, e.g., Freedom from Behavioral Profiling Act of 2000, S. 2360, 106th Cong.
(2000) (bill that would prevent financial institutions from disclosing certain
information unless the consumer affirmatively consented to the transfer of the
information after a clear and conspicuous disclosure); Unsolicited Electronic Mail Act
of 1999, H.R. 3113, 106th Cong. (1999) (bill that would regulate unsolicited
commercial e-mail); Assemb. B. 288, 224th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (bill that
would prevent credit card and debit card issuers from revealing certain consumer
information unless the issuer offered consumers, in a clear and conspicuous notice,
the opportunity to opt out); Jim Hu, House Approves Anti-Spam Legislation,at
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/cn/20000718/tc/house-approves-anti-spam-legislation
_1.html (last updated July 24, 2000) (stating that U.S. House of Representatives
passed a bill that would require unsolicited commercial e-mail to be so labeled). For
a recent Congressional hearing on proposed privacy legislation dealing with spain, see
Spamming: The E-Mail You Want To Can, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Telecomm., Trade and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th
Cong. 1st Sess. (Nov. 3, 1999). See generally David Banisar, Special Report: Several
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what then? Should the Commission take the position that these
matters should be resolved exclusively by Congress, and if Congress
does not do so, the Commission should also not act? Or should the
FTC intervene if Congress does not act within a certain period of
time? The FTC has acted in the past on matters that could have been
left to Congress. For example, the FTC has, by trade regulation rule,
essentially abolished the holder in due course doctrine." The FTC's
power to promulgate trade regulation rules enables it to avoid the
problem of retroactive rule-making referred to above as a drawback
of judicial regulation of the trade in personal information.' If the
Commission can craft a trade regulation rule that properly mediates
among the conflicting interests, that resolution seems preferable to
the current situation in which consumers who wish to opt out face
great difficulties in doing so."'
IV. LITTLE FTC ACT ACTIONS
As discussed above, only the FTC can sue under the FTC Act. But
every state has enacted a "little FTC" act, prohibiting, in one form or
another, deceptive, and sometimes unfair, trade practices." - While
there is considerable variation in the precise wording of the statutes,
most either prohibit a list of specified practices and then contain a
catch-all-such as section 2(12) of the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, which bars a person from engaging "in any other
conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding" -or omit the laundry list and contain only a
broadly-worded injunction. 183 For example, New York's statute states:
"Deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any... service in this
state are hereby declared unlawful."" s
States Plunging into Privacy Proposals, Privacy Times, Jan. 19,2000, at 7.
179. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 27. The FTC's power to promulgate trade regulations
outlawing conduct as unfair or deceptive is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (1994).
181. For a discussion of whether privacy regulation should be entrusted to a
regulatory agency, see Murdock, supra note 44, at 615-18.
182. For a discussion of the characteristics of each state's little FTC Act, see
Sheldon & Carter, supra note 66, at 759-75 app. A.
183. Revised Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 2 (12) (1966), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edulbluIlclfaact99/1920_69/rudtpa66.htm. The Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, published by the National Conference on Uniform
Laws, was adopted in 1964 and revised in 1966. Id. Its influence can be detected in the
following statutes, among others: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-101 (2000); Del. Code Ann.
tit. 6, § 2531 (1999); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 481A (1993); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 51011-7(West 1993); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1211 (West 1997); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
325D.43 (West 1995).
184. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(a) (McKinney 1988): see also N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law.
§ 350 ("False advertising in the conduct of any business trade or commerce or in the
furnishing of any service in this state is hereby declared unlawful.").
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These statutes typically provide for a double-barreled enforcement
strategy: first, a state agency-perhaps the attorney general-can
bring actions on behalf of the state.185 Thus, even if the FTC declines
to expand its activity in this arena, state enforcement agencies could
act. Though that would produce non-uniform rules, we already have
that result to a limited extent because some states have legislated on
privacy while others have not.186
In addition to enforcement by a state agency, most states provide a
private cause of action to consumers who have suffered an injury. 87
Because the typical recovery sought in consumer claims is not large
enough to warrant suit,' 88 the statutes often provide for a bonus for
successful consumer plaintiffs in the form of one or more of multiple
damages,89 punitive damages, 90 and statutory minimum damages.19'
185. For a discussion of the enforcement of consumer protection laws by state
agencies, see generally Steven J. Cole, State Enforcement Efforts Directed Against
Unfair or Deceptive Practices, 56 Antitrust L.J. 125 (1987); Ralph James Mooney, The
Attorney General as Counsel for the Consumer: The Oregon Experience, 54 Or. L.
Rev. 117 (1975); John A. Sebert, Jr., Enforcement of State Deceptive Trade Practice
Statutes, 42 Tenn. L. Rev. 689 (1975); Susan S. Silbey, Case Processing: Consumer
Protection in an Attorney General's Office, 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 849 (1980-81); Note,
The Role of California's Attorney General and District Attorneys in Protecting the
Consumer, 4 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 35 (1971).
186. See supra notes 37,44-52 and accompanying text.
187. Most states have created a private cause of action by statute; in a handful of
states the statute is silent on private claims but the courts have ruled that the statute
implies a private cause of action. See e.g., Sheldon & Carter, supra note 66, §§ 7.1-7.2,
at 453-56, 759-75 app. A; Sovem, Private Actions, supra note 59, at 446-49.
188. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Danforth v. Independence Dodge, Inc., 494 S.W.2d
362, 370 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) ("[I]ndividual action by consumers is much too costly in
that the expense of litigation usually outweighs the amount of likely recovery.");
William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 724, 725
(1972) ("[U]nder the traditional rules of the game, it was less expensive to suffer most
deceptive trade practices than to remedy them through legal action.").
189. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-19-10(a)(2) (1993); Alaska Stat. § 45.50.531(a) (Michie
2000); D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3905(k)(1)(A) (1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-13(b)(1)
(1993); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3) (Law. Co-op. 1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-
14-133(1) (1999); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10 (1995); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19
(West 1989); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-10(B) (Michie 2000); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §
349(h); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.09(B) (Anderson 1993); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73, §
201-9.2 (West 1993); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140 (Law. Co-op. 1985); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 47-18-109(a)(3) (1995); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(b) (Vernon 1987); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2461(b) (1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.090 (West 1999);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 100.20(5) (West 1997).
190. Cal. Civ. Code § 1780(a)(4) (West 1998); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-11Og(a)
(West 2000); D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3905(k)(1)(C) (1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399
(2000); Idaho Code § 48-608 (Michie 1997); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 367.220 (Michie
1996); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.025(1) (West 1990); Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.638(1) (1988);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-5.2(a) (1992).
191. Ala. Code. § 8-19-10(a)(1); Alaska Stat. § 45.50.531(a); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-
13; Idaho Code § 48-608 ; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-634 (1994); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 93A,
§9; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.911(2) (West 1989); Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-133;
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1609 (1998); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10; N.M. Stat. Ann. §
57-12-10(B); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h) Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.638; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit.
73, § 201-9.2; R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-5.2(a); Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-19 (1999); Va.
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The statutes generally contain attorneys' fees provisions as well.Y"
Consequently, if the information practices described in this article
violate a state's little FTC Act, defendants could face significant
exposure.
Do defendants in fact face any risk? Some may think so; in several
recent cases in which marketers' practices were challenged, they
quickly abandoned the practice.9 3 They may have good reason. As
discussed above, it can be argued persuasively that the trade in
personal information violates the FTC Act. Courts interpreting little
FTC acts have found interpretations of the FTC Act enormously
influential."9 Indeed, some state statutes explicitly direct the courts to
Code Ann. § 59.1-204 (Michie 1998); W.Va. Code Ann. § 46A-6-106 (Michie 1999).
192. See Cole, supra note 185, at 130 ("All of those states that have private rights of
action now have provisions for attorneys' fees.") See generally Sheldon & Carter,
supra note 66, § 8.8, at 555-82 (analyzing state law provisions for attorney fees in
depth).
193. See, e.g., Winnie Hu, Chase Bank Agrees to Stop Sharing Data, N.Y. Times.
Jan. 26, 2000, at B1 (reporting that New York Attorney General accused bank of
engaging in deceptive practices by sharing personal and financial information about
customers with telemarketers and advertisers). A copy of the Assurance of
Discontinuance is available at www.oag.state.ny.us/internetilitigationlchase.pdf (last
visited June 6, 2000). See also Dee DePass, U.S. Bank Accused of Consumer Fraud,
Star Tribune (MN), June 10, 1999, at 1A (discussing how Minnesota Attorney
General accused bank of selling customer information to telemarketing company);
News Release, U.S. Bancorp, Minnesota Attorney General and U.S. Bancorp Settle
Customer Privacy Suit (June 30, 1999) (announcing settlement of the case); FTC, N. Y.
State Probe DoubleClick, Reuters, at http'J/news.excite.conifnesf
r/000216/21fbusiness-doublclick-probe (last visited Feb. 22, 2000) (stating that FTC
and New York State Attorney General's Office were conducting informal inquiries
into company that tracks consumer use of Internet and planned to combine
information with people's names and addresses); Matt Fleischer, Click Here for More
Web Suits, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 22, 2000, at Al, available at
http'//www.lawnewsnetwork.com/stories/Al6592-2000Febl8.htm (stating that six
suits were filed against DoubleClick); Mike Godwin, DoubleClick Waits on Business
Plan as Groups File in FTC Action, E-Commerce L. Wkly., Mar. 8, 2000, available at
http://www.lawnewsnetwork.comlstories/Al809l-2000Mar7.html (quoting Double
Click announcement "that it would hold off on its plans to tie personally identifiable
information to Internet users' online surfing habits until government and industry
have reached a consensus on privacy rules for the Internet"), Stefanie Olsen.
ToysR Us.com Drops Tracking Service Amid Pressure, at http.//news.cnet.coninewso-
1007-200-2520471.html (Aug. 14, 2000) (reporting that store dropped customer
tracking service after two class-action lawsuits were filed against it).
194. See, e.g., In re Scrimpsher, 17 B.R. 999, 1015 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982) (making
"synonymous" findings under New York law and the FTC Act); Marshall v. Miller,
276 S.E.2d 397,401 (N.C. 1981) ("The character of the plaintiff, i.e. whether public or
private, should not alter the scope of the remedy under this statute."); Hardy v. Toler,
218 S.E.2d 342, 345 (N.C. 1975) (examining decisions on appeal from the FTC);
Commonwealth ex reL Zimmerman v. Nickel, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 115, 120 (C.P. Mercer
Cty. 1983) (looking to the FTC Act and Commission decisions for guidance); see also
Sheldon & Carter, supra note 66, § 3.4.5.1, at 131 ("Courts... show great deference
to FTC actions in interpreting UDAP statutes [even] where the statute does not
expressly refer to the precedential value of FTC decisions.") Robert D. Cohan, The
Rights and Duties of Retail Merchants Under State Consumer Protection Laws:
Emergent Doctrines and Strategies of the Defense, 18 New Eng. L Rev. 297. 301
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take into account interpretations of the FTC Act. 195 Accordingly,
colorable arguments can be made that selling the personal
information of consumers also violates the little FTC acts of at least
some states.
The fact that states base their interpretations on the FTC Act plays
out in a number of ways. For example, just as with interpretations
under the FTC Act, many states do not regard the fact that a practice
is common within an industry as a defense under little FTC acts. 196
But in one respect, many states have been more generous to
consumers than has the FTC. Many states continue to use the
deception standards the FTC employed before 1983, which permit
courts to find deception more readily, at least in theory.' 97 Under
(1983) ("Even without an express legislative directive, federal authorities should still
be considered where there is a lack of state precedent."); Marshall A. Leaffer &
Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices:
The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
521, 532 (1980) ("[Sitate courts applying these statutes increasingly have adopted the
standards of 'unfairness' and 'deception' that have been developed and used by the
FTC, and approved by the federal courts."); Sovern, Private Actions, supra note 59, at
450 ("It is ... a time honored rule in statutory interpretation that statutes copied from
another jurisdiction are to be interpreted as they were by the originating
jurisdiction."). See generally Jack E. Karns, State Regulation of Deceptive Trade
Practices Under "Little FTC Acts": Should Federal Standards Control?, 94 Dick. L.
Rev. 373 (1990) (evaluating impact of the 1983 Deception Policy Statement in states
that incorporate deference provisions in their little FTC acts)
195. For example, West Virginia's law states:
[T]he purpose of this article is to complement the body of federal law
governing.., unfair, deceptive and fraudulent acts or practices .... It is the
intent of the legislature that, in construing this article, the courts be guided
by the interpretation given by the federal courts to the various federal
statutes dealing with the same or similar matters.
W. Va. Code Ann. § 46A-6-101(1) (Michie 1999); see, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-
104(1) (1999) ("[Ijn construing [Montana's little FTC Act] due consideration and
weight shall be given to the interpretations of the federal trade commission and the
federal courts relating to section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act .... );
see also Ala. Code § 8-19-6 (1975); Alaska Stat. § 45.50.545; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
44-1522 (West 1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-110b(b) (West 2000); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 501.204(2) (West 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-391(b) (2000); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 480-
2(b) (1993); 815 II1. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/2 (West 1999); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, §
207(1) (West 1964); Md. Code Ann., Com. Law II § 13-105 (2000); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 93A, § 2(b) (Law. Co-op. 1994); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:13; N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 57-124; R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-3 (1992); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op.
1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-115 (1996); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §
17.46(c)(1) (Vernon 1987); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit 9, § 2453(b) (1983); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 19.86.920 (West 1999).
196. See Chern v. Bank of Am., 544 P.2d 1310, 1316 (Cal. 1976); People ex rel. Van
de Camp v. Cappuccio, Inc., 251 Cal. Rptr. 657, 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); People v.
Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, 159 Cal. App. 3d 509, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Halloran v. Spillane's Servicenter, Inc. 587 A.2d 176, 184 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990);
Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748, 753 (Mass. 1974).
197- Among those expressing the view that the change in language may have no
significance in application are Greenfield, supra note 72, at 71 ("It is unclear whether
the new articulation changes the standard of deception ... "); Sheldon & Carter,
supra note 66, § 4.2.9, at 145; Crawford, supra note 110, at 305 (commenting that the
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those standards, deception requires only that the offending practice
have a capacity or tendency to deceive the credulous consumer."
Hence, even if the FTC concludes that practices pass muster under the
FTC Act, it is still at least theoretically possible for a state to find the
practices deceptive under their ovn legislation.
A number of cases support the conclusion that at least some
information practices may be actionable. For example, Maryland
defines something as material if a significant number of
unsophisticated consumers would consider the information important
in deciding on a course of action." As the survey evidence discussed
above demonstrates, many consumers view the disclosure of their
personal information as important.110
Some states have ruled that, in some circumstances at least, the
seller's failure to disclose a benefit received from the sale violates a
little FTC act. For example, courts have found deception when sellers
did not inform a car buyer that the car had previously been advertised
at a lower price,- or that the seller was charging excessive dealer
preparation charges in light of the work done by the seller,-"2 or that
securing a new loan would be much less costly than refinancing an old
loan. °31 Though each of these cases is distinguishable, they
demonstrate a willingness by states to hold sellers' feet to the fire on
disclosure issues when the seller benefits from non-disclosure.2"
Hence, in light of the benefits sellers receive from trading in consumer
new standard "represents a ... clarification of-not a change in-[prior) law"). For a
list of citations to state cases using the pre-1983 standards, see Sheldon & Carter,
supra note 66, § 4.2.9, at 145-46, n.79.
198. See, e.g., FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963) (-[lit has
been consistently held that advertising falls within [the FTC Act's] proscription,..
when there is a likelihood or fair probability that the reader will be misled.").
199. Golt v. Phillips, 517 A.2d 328, 332 (Md. 1986); State v. Cottman Transmission
Sys., Inc., 587 A.2d 1190,1194 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
200. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
201. Affrunti v. Vill. Ford Sales, Inc., 597 N.E.2d 1242, 1244 (III. App. Ct. 1992):
Sanders v. Francis, 561 P.2d 1003, 1005-06 (Or. 1977).
202. State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.. 553 P.2d 423. 431-32
(Wash. 1976) (charge not disclosed until after consumer agreed to buy car).
203. In re Milbourne, 108 B.R. 522,537-39 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
204. See also Besta v. Beneficial Loan Co. of Iowa, 855 F.2d 532, 535, (Sth Cir.
1988) (finding finance company violated statute prohibiting unconscionable behavior
when it financed loan over six years without informing borrower of the option to
borrow for three years on better terms): TJ. Fox v. Indus. Cas. Ins. Co., 424 N.E. 2d
839, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (stating insurer could be liable under state little FTC act
for acts of insurer's agent in selling insurance without informing insured that better
and less expensive insurance was available); Browder v. Hanley Dawvson Cadillac Co.,
379 N.E.2d 1206, 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (reversing dismissal of claims that auto
dealer violated common law fiduciary duty and little FTC act by selling insurance
without telling consumer that consumer could obtain cheaper policy with comparable
coverage). But see Gershon v. Hertz Corp., 626 N.Y.S.2d 80.81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(relying on guidelines of National Association of Attorneys General to find no
violation of statute when car rental agency did not tell customer that rates charged
would be lower if customer made reservation at least two hours in advance of rental).
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information, courts may also be willing to require sellers to disclose
their information practices. °5
It is quite clear that many little FTC acts make sellers' omission of
material facts actionable. Some states have written this directly into
their statutes. For example, Maryland proscribes the "[f]ailure to
state a material fact if the failure deceives or tends to deceive. '2 6 A
number of states limit the prohibition on omissions to knowing
omissions, ° but often sellers who also sell personal information have
the requisite scienter.
A number of states have statutes that do not expressly extend to
omissions, but have interpreted their statutes as barring omissions.
Some have done so through regulations. For example, Massachusetts
prohibits the failure "to disclose to a buyer or prospective buyer any
fact, the disclosure of which may have influenced the buyer or
prospective buyer not to enter into the transaction. ' 20 8  Missouri's
regulations also bar omission of material facts,209 while Idaho's
prohibit omitting material or relevant facts that directly, or by
implication, have the capacity and tendency or effect of deceiving
buyers in certain circumstances.21°
Other states have used case law to establish that omissions can be
deceptive. For example, in McRae v. Bolstad, n defendants sold
plaintiff a house without disclosing that the house had chronic sewage
and drainage problems. The court affirmed a judgment for the
plaintiffs under the Washington State little FTC act, which does not
explicitly refer to a duty of disclosure." Similarly, in Johnson v.
205. Cf. Commonwealth v. Source One Assocs., 1999 WL 975120, at *12 (Mass.
Super. Ct. 1999) ("[O]btaining private financial information by pretext for the resale
to others in the circumstances found here constitutes unfair and deceptive acts in
trade or commerce.").
206. Md. Code Ann., Com. Law II § 13-301(3) (2000).
207. See, e.g., Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.46(b)(23) (Vernon 1987)
(prohibiting "the failure to disclose information concerning goods or services which
was known at the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information
was intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer
would not have entered had the information been disclosed").
208. Massachusetts Consumer Protection Regulations, Mass. Regs. Code tit. 940, §
3.16(2) (1994); see also id., § 3.05(1); cf. Mongeau v. Boutelle, 407 N.E.2d 352, 355
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (failure to disclose property encumbered by right of way
actionable under statute).
209. Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 60-7.030, 60-9.110, 60-9.090 (1994).
210. Idaho Rules of Consumer Protection, Idaho Admin. Code 04.02.01.030 (2000).
The section, entitled "False, Misleading or Deceptive Conduct in General" states:
An omission of a material or relevant fact shall be treated with the same
effect as a false, misleading, or deceptive claim or representation, when such
omission, on the basis of what has been stated or implied, would have the
capacity, tendency, or effect of deceiving or misleading a consumer acting
reasonably under the circumstances.
Id.
211. 676 P.2d 496 (Wash. 1984).
212. Id. at 501; see also State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553
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Beverly-Hanks & Associates,213 a real estate broker hired an inspector
whom the sellers had previously hired to inspect the same building.
The court ruled the broker's failure to disclose that fact to the buyer a
deceptive trade practice.1 4
Any consumer suing on this ground would have to come to grips
with Dwyer v. American Express Co.."-1 5  In Dwyer, plaintiffs
unsuccessfully alleged that defendants' practice of renting to others
information about consumers' purchasing habits violated the Illinois
little FTC act. Though the court rejected the claim, its opinion
nevertheless suggests that in other circumstances, plaintiffs' claim
might succeed. The court acknowledged that -[i]t is highly possible
that some customers would have refrained from using the American
Express Card if they had known that defendants were analyzing their
spending habits." '216 Accordingly, the court concluded, albeit in dicta,
that plaintiffs had adequately alleged that defendant's failure to
disclose its information practices was material and deceptive, and that
defendants intended for plaintiffs to rely on the nondisclosure.1 7
Nevertheless, stating "the only damage plaintiffs could have
suffered was a surfeit of unwanted mail," the court held that plaintiffs
had failed adequately to allege damages.2 1 The court explained:
We reject plaintiffs' assertion that the damages in this case arise
from the disclosure of personal financial matters. Defendants only
disclose which of their cardholders might be interested in purchasing
items from a particular merchant based on card usage. Defendants'
practice does not amount to a disclosure of personal financial
matters. Plaintiffs have failed to allege how they were damaged by
defendants' practice of selecting cardholders for mailings likely to be
of interest to them.21 9
How useful Dwyer will be to defendants remains unclear. The case
arguably misconceives the role of little FTC acts, which given their
application to consumer transactions are intended to be used when
the damages approach triviality-that is why so many of them provide
for statutory damages.' ° Indeed, other courts have been quicker to
look to the consumer's mental state than Illinois. For example, a New
P.2d 423, 441 (Wash. 1976) (finding seller's failure to tell joint obligors of automobile
purchase contracts that joint credit life insurance policies could be purchased for a
lower price than separate policies was deceptive).
213. 400 S.E.2d 38,43 (N.C. 1991).
214. Id; see also Conway v. Am. Excavating, Inc., 676 A.2d 881, 887 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1996) (finding purchaser had claim against developer for deception when
developer did not tell purchaser that roadway providing access to lot might later be
moved and roadway was later moved).
215. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
216. Id. at 1357.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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York court held that a consumer could proceed when the consumer
was deceived into thinking a sale price was lower than in fact it was,
even though the consumer did not make a purchase,21 while another
found it deceptive to run an advertisement for a saw stating "Wrap up
a beautiful Christmas" when the store failed to stock enough of the
saws to meet the Christmas demand.22 Consumer claims have been
sustained when the damages totaled less than $20.225 Some states even
permit private suits when plaintiffs have not proved actual damages. 2 4
By contrast, as Dwyer noted, the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act limits
private claims to "any person who suffers actual damage. '"22
Moreover, the Dwyer court overlooked the evidence suggesting that
many consumers are genuinely troubled by the use of their personal
information and that they regard preventing this injury as worthy of
considerable effort, thus suggesting that in fact invasions of privacy do
generate damages.226
Finally, even assuming Dwyer read the law correctly, American
Express activities may still be distinguishable from the information
practices of some other merchants, suggesting that Dwyer offers scant
protection to at least some. American Express had provided the
purchasers of its information with less data about consumers than
some information-sellers engage in. Specifically, plaintiff had
objected to three American Express practices.
First, American Express created six categories, such as "Rodeo
Drive Chic" or "Value Oriented" and then applied those labels to
cardholders so that information-buyers could target a particular type
of consumer.227 Second, American Express offered to create lists that
targeted cardholders who bought specific types of items. 228 Among
the examples given were purchasers of fine jewelry, mail order
221. Geismar v. Abraham & Strauss, 439 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1006 (1981).
222. See De Santis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 543 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989).
223. Thomas v. Busby, 670 So.2d 603, 611 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ($19.13); Wexler v.
Bros. Entm't Group, Inc., 457 N.W.2d 218, 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) ($11.89; court
says "nominal damages support a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act");
cf Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 376 N.E.2d 140, 141 (Mass. 1978) (claiming
injury because of need to make long-distance telephone calls, among other things);
Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) ($50).
224. For example, Connecticut allows the award of punitive damages even in the
absence of actual damages. See Tillquist v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 714 F. Supp. 607,
617 (D. Conn. 1989); Conway v. Am. Excavating, Inc., 676 A.2d 881,887 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1996). California allows people unaffected by an unfair or unlawful practice to
seek an injunction. See Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 514 (Cal. 1985):
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Dev., Inc., 257 Cal. Rptr. 151, 158
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Hernandez v. Atl. Fin. Co. of L.A., 164 Cal. Rptr. 279, 283-84
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
225. Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1357; see 815 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/10a (West 1999).
226. See supra notes 17-18, 84 and accompanying text.
227. Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1353.
228. Id.
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apparel buyers, home-improvement shoppers, electronics shoppers,
luxury lodgers, cardholders with children, skiers, frequent business
travelers, resort users, travelers to Asia or Europe, luxury European
car owners, or recent movers.Q " Third, American Express offered
joint marketing arrangements to certain sellers. -'  That kind of
information seems much less specific than some of the lists reported to
be available, such as lists that focus on race, religion, or a problem
with incontinence, or purchases of very specific and personal items,
such as skimpy swimwear, wigs, and hair removal products. "  Hence,
conceivably a court, which would find American Express had not
injured a consumer, would find that other list-sellers had.
In sum, though it is by no means certain, information practices that
are currently in widespread use may indeed violate state little FTC
acts. 2 Marketers should think carefully about whether they wish to
alter their practices.
CONCLUSION
Information privacy advocates have given considerable attention
either to common law invasion of privacy torts or new legislation,
both of which have some appeal in addressing privacy concerns. But
they have generally overlooked two other sources of privacy
regulation: the FTC Act and state little FTC acts, or deceptive trade
practices statutes. I have argued that common information
practices-collecting transactional information about consumers and
selling it to others without the knowledge or consent of the affected
consumers-violates both the FTC Act and state statutes.
Thus far, the FTC does not seem disposed to use its powers under
the FTC Act to force merchants to obtain consumer consent before
trading in their information. As only the FTC has the power to
enforce the FTC Act, that ends the matter. But the state statutes can
be enforced both by state agencies and, in most states, injured
consumers. Marketers of consumer information may soon find
themselves under attack from an unexpected direction-one that
often provides for statutory damages, multiple damages, and
attorneys' fees for successful plaintiffs.
229. Id
230. Id
231. See supra note 13. For reports of these and a variety of other lists, see Sovern,
Opting 1n, Opting Out, supra note 7.
232. A drawback to the use of little FTC acts to determine that information
practices are unlawful is that they are likely to be applicable retroactively. See supra
note 27 and accompanying text. State authorities can ameliorate that problem by
providing notice of their intent to use the statutes in such a fashion. But private
litigants, who are likely to be less concerned with the public welfare, may choose not
to do that.
Notes & Observations
